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CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

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by

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In a recent article Herbert Kaufman observes that in this country "opportunities for participation in political decisions are plentiful. Why, then," he asks, "is there dissatisfaction with these arrangements?"

Fundamentally, because substantial (though minority) segments of the population apparently believe the political, economic, and social systems have not delivered to them fair--even minimally fair--shares of the system's benefits and rewards, and because they think they cannot win their appropriate shares in those benefits and rewards through the political institutions of the country as these are now constituted.

For this review of the literature on participation,² I summarize and evaluate recent studies which identify some of the sociopsychological, strategic, and structural determinants of the rate at which citizens participate and their effectiveness. No one could have predicted the fervent response that the phrase, "maximum feasible participation of the poor", evoked. Now, amidst chorusing demands for increased participation, would seem to be an appropriate time to assess how useful is the growing literature on participation for understanding this phenomenon.

In this review I discuss participation in politics and administration separately, even though many of the same considerations apply (and I sometimes violate this guideline). I do so because the literature divides easily into two parts: political scientists and political sociologists have long been interested in the problem of participation, but organization theorists and public administrators have only recently begun to deal with it. Another reason for making this distinction is that those who demand increased participation do so; as Kaufman points out, new demands for participation have centered primarily on administrative agencies.

I begin Part One of this review by asking whether there is a relationship between the rate at which citizens participate in politics and their effectiveness. Generally, the assumption is made that people who participate more receive more benefits from the political system, but the existing evidence also supports the opposite view that people who receive more participate more. Next I survey the wide and convoluted range of goals that participation has been expected to achieve. Then I examine how political structures affect the rate and effectiveness with which citizens participate, a relatively unexplored field. In Part Two I describe how participation may be used to relate an individual to an organization, and then explore the conditions under which bureaucracies distribute benefits to particular groups, the better to assess the conditions under which participation enhances bureaucratic responsiveness.

¹ Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," Public Administration Review (Jan-Feb 1969), 4.

² The original version of this paper was prepared as a background paper for the HUD/NYU Conference on Citizen Involvement in Urban Affairs, held at Lake Mohonk, New York, September 7-20, 1968. I am grateful to Professors Aaron Wildavsky and Matthew Stoltz for their comments on this revision, and to the Oakland Project, funded first by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and then the Urban Institute, for support and stimulation during four years of graduate study at the University of California at Berkeley and field work in Oakland.

I. Political Participation

A. Participation: Rates and Effectiveness

Much of the existing literature on political participation in the United States describes how likely to participate in various political activities are individuals with various personal characteristics, attitudes, skills and experiences who are located at different positions in the social structure. (The findings of this literature are outlined in the Appendix). In general, people who are effective in private life are effective in public life, people with more education know more about politics, people who care about what happens in politics participate more, people who engage in some political activities are highly likely to participate in others, and people of higher socio-economic status are more likely to possess the characteristics which lead to high rates of participation. However, we can discover little about how this pattern of political stratification affects the way in which the political system distributes benefits among social groups. In general social scientists have focused upon how it benefits the political system as a whole rather than particular groups. Let us briefly examine how two representative social scientists have incorporated political stratification into their theories of democratic decision-making--Bernard Berelson, who links it with political stability, and Charles Lindblom who links it with political rationality.

In Voting Bernard R. Berelson argues that the political system benefits when individuals and groups participate at different rates.¹ He rejects the high standards for citizen participation and competence set by traditional democratic theory; by these standards, most citizens lack sufficient political interest, knowledge, principle and rationality. American democracy has survived because the political system as a whole compensates for these deficiencies. All individuals need not possess democratic virtues; in fact, "some of the most important requirements that democratic values impose on a system require a voting population that is not homogeneous but heterogeneous in its political qualities."² Such an electorate permits the political system to balance involvement and indifference, stability and flexibility, progress and conservatism, consensus and cleavage, individualism and collectivism.

Berelson describes how political stratification improves the political system's ability to perform one of its functions--maintaining an equilibrium among competing groups and demands; but political systems also set goals, adapt means to ends, and teach citizens political roles. They extract contributions from some social groups and distribute benefits to the same or other groups in order to survive. Does the rate at which individuals or groups participate affect the benefits they receive from the political system, or does that rate have little to do with their political effectiveness? By focusing upon benefits to the political system, Berelson overlooks how political stratification affects the distribution of costs or benefits to particular individuals and groups: he ignores those situations in which the interests of the political system differ from those of its members.

¹ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), Ch. 14.

² Ibid., 313.



Charles Lindblom focuses upon leaders rather than voters, and political rationality rather than political stability, but, as we shall see, he, too, believes that political stratification benefits the political system and ignores its consequences for particular groups.

Focusing upon the difficulties administrators and legislators have making policy when values conflict and information is scarce, Lindblom contrasts two decision-making methods: rational-comprehensiveness and successive limited comparisons.³ (In The Intelligence of a Democracy, he compares central coordination and partisan mutual adjustment).⁴ He rejects the rational-comprehensive method for most purposes because it sets higher standards than decision-makers can realize in practice, and argues that the political system as a whole compensates for the cognitive deficiencies of individual decision-makers. As long as heterogeneous partisans can make themselves heard at some point in the decision-making process, a decision-maker need not comprehend all aspects of a problem, but can negotiate adjustments as partisans raise objections. Lindblom premises the viability of this partisan mutual adjustment process upon a division of labor whereby, ideally,

... every important interest or value has its watchdog. And these watchdogs can protect the interests in their jurisdiction in two quite different ways: first, by redressing damages done by other agencies; and, second, by anticipating and heading off injury before it occurs.

In a society like that of the United States in which individuals are free to combine to pursue almost any possible common interest they might have and in which government agencies are sensitive to the pressures of these groups, the system described is approximated. Almost every interest has its watchdog. Without claiming that every interest has a sufficiently powerful watchdog, it can be argued that our system often can assure a more comprehensive regard for the values of the whole society than any attempt at intellectual comprehensiveness.⁵

Lindblom argues that frequently the only test of a "good" policy is whether decision-makers agree to it, not whether the policy attains some specified objectives.⁶ Since partisans surely measure a policy against their own objectives, Lindblom must mean that such policies are "good" for the political system. Responsible for managing conflict, a political system benefits when conflicting groups agree upon a policy. Partisan, on the other hand, might evaluate the same policy differently. They might, after all, have been coerced into agreement. Lindblom does not examine whether some social groups have more influence than others in particular negotiating

³ Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler, and Paul A. Smith, eds., Politics and Social Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 339-48.

⁴ Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

⁵ Lindblom, "'Muddling Through,'" 345.

⁶ Ibid., 343.

situations. But we know that many groups lack sufficiently powerful "watch-dogs" to make themselves heard by decision-makers. Many other groups are heard, but not heeded. To what extent does the amount of political resources that a group has determine the amount of benefits it receives from the partisan mutual adjustment process? In The Intelligence of a Democracy, Lindblom argues that the "weights" attached to values can be varied. He acknowledges that: "To propose to reallocate weights in partisan mutual adjustment appears to call for striking against those participants most able to resist the reallocation,"⁷ but calls this a fallacious argument, reasoning:

If it is true that there is very little possibility for deliberate change in the distribution of power in partisan mutual adjustment, and if it is also true that those who are able to suppress change do so through the exercise of their power in contemporary partisan mutual adjustment, then it indeed appears to be the case that partisan mutual adjustment cannot be much reformed. This conclusion is, however, fallacious. For on these assumptions it is not the case that partisan mutual adjustment cannot be much reformed; it is only the case that the particular form of partisan mutual adjustment present in the United States today cannot be much reformed. Now if this, if true, would be a damning feature of contemporary American partisan mutual adjustment, what is its significance for choice between mutual adjustment and centrality? The answer is that it closes off the potential for centrality quite as tightly as for mutual adjustment, for almost nothing is possible except the status quo. Hence this hypothetical feature of contemporary American mutual adjustment does not support a devaluation of partisan mutual adjustment relative to centrality.⁸

Lindblom gets into difficulty here because he links the "goodness" of a decision with the process by which it is made. His challengers apply other criteria--in this case, whether the policies made serve the interests of one group or many. Lindblom responds that if power is concentrated in groups who control the partisan mutual adjustment process, then they can prevent changes in weights of values. Decisions made under these circumstances do not meet his challengers' substantive criteria, but they do meet his processual criteria so long as the partisans bargain among themselves. Shifting the focus of the argument, Lindblom asks whether a centralized decision-making system would make better decisions under these circumstances (judged by substantive criteria), and he responds, no, and concludes that decision-makers should continue to value partisan mutual adjustment. I suspect that Lindblom is "really" arguing that decision-making in democracy is a rational or more rational than decision-making in a totalitarian regime; but even if we grant that a political system which uses partisan mutual adjustment is superior to one which uses central coordination, the question remains whether, within a democratic mutual adjustment system, one should evaluate what decision-makers decide as well as how they decide it. Using only processual criteria, as Lindblom does, one cannot measure how well a political system practices democratic values. Like Berelson, Lindblom is

⁷ Lindblom, Intelligence, 300.

⁸ Ibid., 301-2.

able to endorse the existing political stratification system because he overlooks those situations in which the interests of the political system differ from those of some of its members; and like Berelson, he focuses upon how decision-makers resolve conflicts among rival claimants, ignoring how they set goals, go about achieving them, and induce citizens to accept their fate.

The assumption that those who participate more benefit more has led some social scientists to assume that blacks participate less than whites (and thus, have only themselves to blame for their failure to benefit more from the political system). Recently, however, several studies have demonstrated that blacks participate no less than whites of similar socioeconomic status, and frequently participate more,⁹ but they are less satisfied with the results. Cataldo, Johnson, and Kellstedt found that

At each educational level, the gap between evaluations (of how effectively government performed a series of basic functions) and expectations (of governmental responsibility to perform these functions) is consistently and significantly higher for Negroes than for whites. Whites appear quite satisfied; indeed, college educated whites appear to feel that government is actually doing more than it ought to. It is important to notice that Negro dissatisfaction is not greatest among the lowest education but among the high school educated followed by the college educated, the groups which were found to evidence the highest levels of participation.¹⁰

These findings are supported by those reported by Sidney Verba. Negro respondents are only slightly less likely than whites

... to believe that the government is responsive to elections but the difference is not great, and they are as likely to think that Congressmen are responsive to their constituents. But when it comes to their expectation of treatment for themselves in an administrative office or by the police, there are sharp differences between Negroes and whites. Negroes are less likely to expect equal treatment and less likely to expect officials to be responsive. For instance, 87 per cent of the white sample expects equal treatment in a government office; only 49 per cent of the Negro sample does.¹¹

⁹ See for example, Anthony M. Orum, "A Reappraisal of the Social and Political Participation of Negroes," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (July 1966), 446-56; N. Babchuk and R. Thompson, "The Voluntary Association of Negroes," American Sociological Review, 27 (October 1962), 647-55; S. John Dackawich, "Voluntary Associations of Central Area Negroes," Pacific Sociological Review, 9 (Fall 1966), 74-8.

¹⁰ Everett F. Cataldo, Richard M. Johnson, and Lyman A. Kellstedt, "The Urban Poor and Community Action in Buffalo." Paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. May 2-3, 1968.

¹¹ Sidney Verba, "Democratic Participation in Comparative Perspective," prepared for the Participation Subgroup, Social Indicator Panel, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, August 1967.



Based upon a theory of the cycle of poverty, the poverty program assumed that poor people were apathetic. If they were less apathetic and alienated, they would take advantage of opportunities for a better life which existed in abundance. Consequently, the poverty program concentrated upon altering the attitudes of the poor toward their life changes, work, education, and political action. Once the Community Action Program was underway, however, poor people demonstrated that their problem was not apathy. Martin Rein observes: "As soon as the project offered an opportunity that seemed genuine, there was more response than could be handled."¹² Motivation, they had aplenty; opportunities, they did not. The poverty program experience suggests that we should replace the proposition, if people participated more, they would benefit more, with the proposition, if people benefited more, they would participate more.

Some social scientists have wondered whether citizens who currently enjoy more social, economic, or political benefits exercise more influence over the decisions of government. In Who Governs?, for example, Dahl asks: "How does a 'democratic' system work amid inequality of resources?"¹³ On the basis of his research in New Haven, he concludes that the political system is open to talent. Although some people have more political resources than others, everyone has some resources which, if used with skill and energy, may lead to political influence. As his use of economic metaphors indicates, Dahl adopts an entrepreneurial stance toward politics. The notions of resources, potential resources, and pyramiding resources, but particularly, the notions of skill and activity, suggest the old Protestant Ethic maxims of frugality and hard work, leading to success and upward mobility. But Dahl fails to analyze what differing amounts of resources will buy: he ignores the question of "who benefits?" when political resources are distributed unequally in the population. But, maybe political self-help among those with few political resources is no more effective than economic self-help among the poor.

Protest is a self-help political strategy. In his analysis of protest activity Michael Lipsky begins by assuming that, although most citizens have some political resources, some citizens have very few indeed. Consequently, protest leaders, who have few political resources, must mobilize third parties who can bring their more plentiful resources to bear upon the protesters' target. Since appeals framed to arouse the interest of third parties may not sustain the interest of organization members, they frequently face difficulties in maintaining their organizations, and must continually juggle their many constituencies. If protest leaders accept the constraints of working through third parties, expend an enormous amount of energy in attracting their interest and skillfully managing conflicts between multiple constituencies, they may succeed in focussing attention upon a problem, but not in gaining access to the decision-making processes which may resolve it.

¹² Martin Rein, "Community Action Programs: A Critical Reassessment," Poverty and Human Resources Abstracts, 3 (May-June 1968). 4.

¹³ Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), 3.



Lipsky writes:

Protest groups are uniquely capable of raising the saliency of issues, but are unequipped--by virtue of their lack of organizational resources--to participate in the formulation or adoption of solutions to problems they dramatize. Access, expertise and constant interaction between individuals in the housing area describe a restricted system of policy decision-making which is sensitive to pressure, but relatively impervious to the participation of protest groups.¹⁴

The rent strikers in New York received but token satisfaction for their prodigious efforts. From this analysis, we might conclude that the amount of resources a group musters determines the amount of benefits it receives from the political system. However, John Strange adds another dimension to our understanding of resources.

In his analysis of protest activities in Durham, Strange notes that after a long struggle, the black community 'finally won two major victories.'"

But the political resources which the black community had to bring to the contest were enormous: unanimous support of all blacks, including the wealthy and "respectable" Negro establishment; three mass marches; an implicit threat (at least as far as the white community was concerned) that violence was eminent; and continued, unrelenting effort on the part of the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs, United Organizations for Community Improvement, the masses of poor blacks, and other Negro groups. It is interesting to note the relative ease with which some 246 whites achieved a victory similar to Bacon Street some two weeks earlier. They merely hired themselves a lawyer.¹⁵

The language of political resources creates the assumption that political objectives are attainable if the political actors meet the price in political resources, but Strange demonstrates that officeholders are capable of varying the price according to the customer. From this analysis, we might conclude that prejudice and ideology regulate the political market.

If, as it appears, we have recently entered a period of increased concern for the responsiveness of government to citizens, then social scientists will no doubt be paying more attention to how political stratification affects who benefits from the political system. When they do so, they will have to clarify to a greater extent than they have already the answers to the following questions: To what extent does the rate at which individuals and groups participate affect the benefits they receive

¹⁴ Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1970), 122.

¹⁵ John Strange, "The Politics of Protest: The Case of Durham," prepared for delivery at the 1968 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, November 7-9, 1968.



from the political system? To what extent does the amount of political resources a group has determine the amount of benefits it receives from the political system? To what extent does the difference between the ideologies of the incumbents and the insurgents determine the amount of benefits the insurgents receive from the political system? Another question, examined at a later point in this essay, is: To what extent do political and economic structures determine how much citizens participate and how effective they are?



B. Participation for What?

Increased citizen participation has been prescribed as a strategy for achieving many different goals. In this section, I identify four categories of goals and examine representative strategies for achieving them. I have found that the Parsonian categories--socialization, integration, adaptation, and goal attainment--provide a handy check-list of goals. Generally speaking, analysts who pursue socialization or integration value political stability, those who focus upon adaptation value political rationality, and those who focus upon goal attainment value political conflict. In the following sections, I shall identify the analyst's goals and examine how he perceives obstacles to their achievement, the resources and techniques available for overcoming them, and the anticipated results.

SOCIALIZATION (PATTERN MAINTENANCE)

According to William Mitchell on Parsonian usage, pattern-maintenance in a social system requires "indoctrinating the member personalities with appropriate values and motivations to maintain their support and guide their actions", while tension-management, "a second aspect of the same general problem," calls for "'managing' the tension that results in members from emotional disturbances and distractions."¹⁶

In Community Control Alan Altshuler advocates community control as a technique for socializing blacks into the political and economic systems and creating "social peace."¹⁷ If cities formed neighborhood government, black citizens would have the opportunity to learn how to become responsible citizens,¹⁸ and, within their own neighborhood at least, would be treated with respect by (not very competent) bureaucrats,¹⁹ and experience equality of opportunity in jobs under the neighborhood government's control; while the rest of us could enjoy "the peace of reconciliation"²¹ (the peace that comes when each race is reconciled to its place in the socioeconomic and political hierarchies), and feel confident that blacks will obey the law because they have been given "a tangible stake in the American political system."²² Altshuler argues that community control is feasible since whites "really have no stake in who governs the ghettos"²³ (blacks can have cast-off white governments), and failed to socialize blacks while they were in power

¹⁶William Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics: The Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 59-60.

¹⁷I base my comments in this section upon Altshuler's "Personal Statement," which appears as Chapter 5, in Community Control (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

¹⁸Ibid., 205.

¹⁹Ibid., 204-5.

²⁰Ibid., 201.

²¹Ibid., 193, 195, 199.

²²Ibid., 199.

²³Ibid., 197.



(blacks "could hardly do worse").²⁴ He argues that whites should allow blacks the experience of majority status "at the lowest tier of American government,"²⁵ and should encourage blacks to own property, since "possession of property and the exercise of responsibility are both 'conservatizing' experiences."²⁶ At the present time, as he points out, loans and quality merchandise are not readily available to ghetto consumers.²⁷ Perhaps in order to facilitate the acquisition of property, he recommends that blacks front for white lending institutions and absorb the suspicion that higher interest charges in the ghetto are caused by racial discrimination,²⁸ and manufacturers of brand-name merchandise permit ghetto retailers to charge more than the list-price.²⁹ Blacks want many things, Altshuler reports:

They want more and better jobs. They want massive redistributive public programs. They want integration. They want to own property. They want to be treated with respect by civil servants, employers, and merchants. They want to see their own kind in positions of power, prestige, and wealth. They want credit, insurance, and decent merchandise at prices comparable to those paid by whites. And, of course, many of them want community control. (196-7)³⁰

However, "white resistance to massive desegregation and redistribution is overwhelming, and it comes from all segments of white society." (197)³¹ Accepting this resistance as given, he suggests that community control "is probably the most feasible major demand that blacks are now making," and is substitutable for the other things that blacks want.³² Altshuler argues from the imputed attitudes of whites to a program for blacks; missing from his argument is any discussion of the responsibility of government and political, civic, and educational leaders for changing the behavior and attitudes of citizens who oppose racial equality. One must surely question his assumption that if disaffected groups participate more, they will grant legitimacy to the political system's processes regardless of its performance.

²⁴ Ibid., 214.

²⁵ Ibid., 203.

²⁶ Ibid., 205.

²⁷ Ibid., 212-3.

²⁸ Ibid., 212.

²⁹ Ibid., 212-3.

³⁰ Ibid., 196-7.

³¹ Ibid., 197.

³² Ibid.

In making this argument, Altshuler ignores the substantive bases of democratic consent.

Underlying Altshuler's analysis is the implicit assumption that blacks are outside the American political system. Thus, it is not surprising that he draws an analogy between former colonies and ghetto communities: "Countries new to self-government are rarely very good at it,"³³ he observes, and admonishes whites not to expect that ghetto neighborhood government will be very efficient or effective. However, "we may hope that over time it will provide a mechanism for increasing competence through out the black community."³⁴ Altshuler believes that blacks are poor and unemployed and criminals and disorderly because they are under-socialized³⁵ but in time and the right setting, they will learn. Contrary to Altshuler's assumption, however, blacks are not outside the American political system. Rather, these so-called outsiders have been in the system all along but have consistently lost in the contest for scarce resources that has been conducted under rules sanctioned by the American political system. If this is the case, the source of the problem is less likely to be the undersocialization of blacks than injustice in the political system.

ADAPTATION

"... (A)adaptation is concerned with the provision of facilities and not the selection or choice of goals."³⁶ Congruent with Mitchell's exegesis, I shall regard the general purpose of participation as adaptation when the analyst treats the specific goal for which he is designing a strategy as given and focuses his attention upon the mobilization and transformation of resources to achieve it. Thus, William C. Loring, Frank L. Sweetser, and Charles F. Ernst recommend citizen participation to those who are committed to the goal of urban renewal and must cope with the obstacle of a housing shortage. As they point out, a housing supply supplemented at public expense is costly; and, furthermore, "many citizens and many city officials have reason to be discouraged by the apathy, the greed, the seeming lack of civic pride so prevalent in many of our communities that need renewal action."³⁷

³³Ibid., 209.

³⁴Ibid., 210.

³⁵Ibid., 214.

³⁶Mitchell, 62. "The adaptation or provision of facilities is a problem for the simple reason that goals can not be achieved without resources. Resources are not useful, however, until they have been converted into specific tools and technologies to meet specific problems of goal-attainment or production All social systems including their subsystems are confronted with the need to acquire and produce ample supplies of useful resources because they are limited and require a transformation process."

³⁷William C. Loring, Jr., Frank I. Sweetser, and Charles F. Ernst, Community Organization for Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal (Boston: Massachusetts Department of Commerce, 1957), 213.

Citizens in these areas passively accept deteriorating housing and outmoded neighborhoods "as unpleasant but unavoidable features of city living."³⁸ With community participation, however, citizens can be induced to change these attitudes, with the consequent release of

... the tremendous and now unorganized manpower represented by the spare-time energies of those city dwellers whose living conditions show room for improvement. If they are not induced to help themselves through skilled application of community organization efforts, the alternative, if improvement is to take place, lies only in expensive public intervention in, and even ownership of, residential areas.³⁹

They reason that with a small investment in community organizers, a city can save on housing expenditures and invest in "development projects" that will attract "elements of the population which currently afford suburban locations" back to the city.⁴⁰ Thus, participation serves the goals of planners and others committed to urban renewal.

James Q. Wilson, however, points out that the participation of certain groups may jeopardize urban renewal.⁴¹ Whereas Loring, et al., anticipate that citizen participation will cause lower-class residents to change their attitudes, making them more compatible with the planners' goals, Wilson fears that citizen participation will merely inject the attitudes of the poor into the planning process--attitudes which are qualitatively different from those of the middle-class. Middle-class participants in urban renewal planning evaluate the impact of renewal programs on the city as a whole (they are "public-regarding"), while lower-class participants evaluate the impact of the renewal program on themselves (they are 'private-regarding'). Thus, it

³⁸Ibid., 217.

³⁹Ibid., 226.

⁴⁰Ibid., 211. The authors point out that citizen participation has the additional advantages of inducing citizens to accept greater changes than they would if they had not participated; and early participation heads off subsequent organization efforts in opposition to specific recommendations by planners for the renewal project. They also give some practical advice:

In the case of probable clearance projects, the time for starting participation is when official thinking about the feasibility of redeveloping an area arrives at the first point at which news about official intentions becomes public, i.e., upon requesting a city council vote of approval of submission of applications for federal preliminary planning advances.

In the case of potential rehabilitation-conservation situations, the starting time is prior to any such news break, so that the formal official decision to study the area may come after some neighborhood association invites official attention to the possibilities of the neighborhood, and so creates an impression of requested cooperation rather than offious intervention. (221)

⁴¹James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," in James Q. Wilson, ed., Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 407-21.



is frequently the case that the middle-class participants, sharing the perspectives of the planners and city administration, lend their support in securing the acceptance of the program in the neighborhood, while the lower-class participants react negatively to the renewal plans. In fact, "the higher the level of indigenous organization in a lower-class neighborhood, the lower the prospects for renewal in that area."⁴² "Perhaps this explains why, at least until very recently, most local urban renewal directors made no effort to encourage citizen participation except on a city-wide basis-- with little or no representation from the affected neighborhood."⁴³

In his analysis of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, Wilson notes that the members were "upper-middle-class professors, housewives, and business and professional men (both white and Negro)" who would ultimately benefit from renewal. They planned to remain in the community and their "peace, security, cultural life, and property values would probably be enhanced by a successful renewal plan. The persons who were to be moved out of the community and whose apartments and homes were to be torn down were usually lower-income Negroes who, with very few exceptions, were not part of the Community Conference."⁴⁴ But, Wilson points out, the lower-income Negroes were indirectly represented in the Conference. And he maintains that the crucial distinction is not self-interest, but community-regardingness.

Wilson observes that if efforts are made to involve lower-class residents in citizen participation in urban renewal:

...we had better prepare ourselves for a drastic reevaluation of the potential impact of that program. Adjusting the goals of renewal to the demands of the lower classes means, among other things, substantially reducing the prospects for assembling sufficiently large tracts of cleared land to make feasible the construction of dwelling units attractive to the middle-class suburbanite whom the city is anxious to woo back into its taxing jurisdiction. This, in turn, means that the central city may have to abandon the goal of recolonizing itself with a tax-paying, culture-loving, free-spending middle class and be content instead with serving as a slightly dilapidated way-station in which lower-income and minority groups find shelter and a minimal level of public services while working toward the day when they, too, can move out to a better life.⁴⁵

Thus Wilson anticipates that participation will affect the distribution of benefits from urban renewal. However, his choice of terms and the largely negative picture he draws of the consequences suggest that he has reservations about the desirability of this outcome. He offers no technique for overcoming the obstacle of lower-class attitudes toward urban renewal than the implicit one of not involving them in planning when extensive urban renewal is desired.

⁴² Ibid., 417.

⁴³ Ibid..

⁴⁴ Ibid., 412.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 418.

Between them, Loring and Wilson raise the fundamental problem involved in the participation strategy aimed at adaption--who prescribes the goal which the community is subsequently organized to achieve and who benefits from the achievement of that goal. In the case of the strategies examined, the benefits were distributed unevenly among social classes. Wilson makes it quite clear that the planners' goals are those of the middle-class. The expenditure of funds to attract suburban residents back to the central city is at best a long-range strategy to help poor people. It is premised upon an assumption that benefits will "trickle down" to the poor. If the problems of poor people, the problems of redistribution, are to be confronted more directly, it would seem that they must play a role in determining the goals.

INTEGRATION

For Parsons, integration is a problem for social systems and personalities. "Getting people to work together who are competing (for scarce resources) or have just competed is not likely to be easy," especially when they "differ in their values, norms, and beliefs, as well as in their interests."

Even if men shared the same normative orientations and scarcity were not a fact, it would still be possible to say there was an integrative problem. The coordination of men and resources is an inevitable problem in segmented and differentiated systems. Man cannot avoid but must confront the task of integration at the social system level.⁴⁶

At the level of personality, Parsons assumes that "'adjudicating' conflicts within the person is a never ending task, for although man has been most imaginative in seeking solutions and devising mechanisms to resolve such problems he has never and probably will never eliminate the problems or their causes."⁴⁷

In Crisis in Black and White Charles Silberman reports on Saul Alinsky's imaginative solution to the problem of integration at the organizational and personality levels. In his account of Alinsky's strategy, he argues that "personal organization" is positively correlated with "community organization."

Silberman begins his account with an attack on "welfare colonialism." Social workers have concentrated on teaching maladjusted individuals how to adapt themselves to society rather than on changing those aspects of society that make the individual what he is.⁴⁸ But their principal fault has been their "preoccupation with doing for people instead of doing with them--a preoccupation which destroys the dignity and arouses the hostility of the people who are supposed to be helped."⁴⁹ The problems will not be solved

⁴⁶ Mitchell, 61.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 311-2.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 313.

with federal crash programs; "the Negroes, like every other group, can really be helped in only one way: by giving them the means with which to help themselves."⁵⁰ Alinsky "really believes that the helpless, the poor, the badly educated can solve their own problems if given the chance and the means." "There are two sources of power in Alinsky's view: money and people. Since the residents of Woodlawn and other areas like it obviously have no money, their only source of power is themselves--which is to say the creation of an effective organization."⁵¹ "Alinsky uses the classical approach of trade union organization; he appeals to the self-interest of the local residents and to their resentments and distrust of the outside world, and he seeks out and develops a local indigenous leadership." But the initial impetus must come from outside, . . . (from) full-time organizers who know how to conquer the apathy of the slum and how to weld together its disparate fragments into a unified whole. For the indigenous leaders of the slum area are not in touch with each other; without training, they lack the skills needed to keep a large organization running; and in most cases it has never occurred to any of them to lead a mass organization."⁵²

It is impossible to understand Alinsky's tactics, in fact, without understanding the basic dilemma inherent in organizing any slum area, and particularly a Negro slum. The basic characteristic of the slum--its "life style," so to speak---is apathy; no organization can be created unless this apathy can be overcome. But slum residents will not stir unless they see a reasonable chance of winning, unless there is some evidence that they can change things for the better... (I)t is not true that the very poor have nothing to lose...

Quite frequently, therefore, the apathy that characterizes the slum represents what in many ways is a realistic response to a hostile environment. But realistic or not, the adjustment that is reached is one of surrender to the existing conditions and abdication of any hope of change. The result is a community seething with inarticulate resentments and dormant hostilities repressed for safety's sake, but which break out every now and then in some explosion of deviant or irrational behavior. The slum dwellers are incapable of acting, or even of joining, until these suppressed resentments and hostilities are brought to the surface where they can be seen as problems--i.e., as a condition you can do something about.

And so Alinsky pleads guilty to the charge of being an agitator, of arousing dormant hostilities or rubbing raw the sores of discontent...⁵³

Thus community participation becomes community therapy with the organizer as the therapist.⁵⁴ In spite of the fact that Silberman rejects the social worker's conception of the individual, he continues to view the slum community as pathological and in need of treatment from an understanding 'helper.'

⁵⁰ Ibid., 317.

⁵¹ Ibid., 323.

⁵² Ibid., 325.

⁵³ Ibid., 333-5.

⁵⁴ See Alan Walker, "Some Relations Between Community Development and Rogers' Client-Centered Therapy," Community Development Review, 6 (March 1961), 20-6.



What makes the Woodlawn Organization significant, however, is not so much what it is doing for its members as what it is doing to them...

Besides giving its members a sense of dignity and worth, the Woodlawn Organization has given a good many people a sense of direction and purpose and an inner discipline that has enabled them to overcome the "floundering phenomenon." . . . Like so many other Woodlawnites, (a particular man) had been accustomed to waste enormous amounts of time and energy through sheer inefficiency, i.e., personal disorganization. This made the initial organizing work more difficult than anything the organizers had ever encountered in white slums; at first, every little venture seemed to fail because of the personal disorganization... Bit by bit, however, the members learned how to accept orders, how to carry out a simple task and follow through on it; then they begin to learn how to organize a rent strike or a rally, how to handle a meeting, how to talk on their feet and debate an issue, how to handle the opposition. The result, for those who have been actively involved in the organization, has been to transform their existence, for the discipline of the organization gradually imposes itself on their own lives. And as the individual learns to organize his own life, he learns how to relate to others.⁵⁵

Note that Silberman agrees with Loring et al. that the principle plentiful resource in the ghetto is untapped time and energy: poor people are lazy. Both agree that community organization can change attitudes and encourage self-help, overcoming apathy and indifference to undesirable conditions. However, they differ in that, under Loring's plan, the organizers work for the city in the interests of a particular program, whereas Alinsky's organizers are invited it, financed by, and serve at the pleasure of the community. And self-help means power, not clean-up/fix-up campaigns.

Silberman admits in the end that "It would be inane to present that Woodlawn has become a model community; it remains a poverty-stricken, crime-ridden slum, though a slum with hope."⁵⁶ In other words, attitude change requires fewer resources than social change. However, he reasons:

Most of the problems that make Woodlawn what it is--high unemployment, lack of education, family disorganization, poor health, bad housing--cannot be solved by a community organization alone...TWO's greatest contribution, therefore, is its most subtle: it gives Woodlawn residents the sense of dignity that makes it possible for them to accept help. For help now comes (or seems to come, which amounts to the same thing) not as the result of charity but as the result of their own power.⁵⁷

A sense of power (realistic or not) keeps people from feeling powerless.

⁵⁵Silberman, 346-7.

⁵⁶Ibid., 348.

⁵⁷Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

Murray G. Ross recommends community organization as a strategy for creating integration at the societal level.

In countries in which industrialization and urbanization are relatively well advanced, the focus of concern is the loss of community as a meaningful form of social and moral association. In fact, as Nisbet points out, the current popularity of such words as disorganization, disintegration, decline, insecurity, breakdown, instability, and the like has relevance to trends in community life in industrialized countries. The urban center is impersonal, lacking in cohesion, an ineffective political or social unit which provides inadequate soil for full personality development.⁵⁸

Without integration at the societal level, personal integration is harder to achieve.

Some appraisal of the effect of urban life on the individual is seen in Lawrence K. Frank's Society as the Patient, and in the writing of Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan, all of whom see the impersonality and remoteness of relationships in the city as contributing factors to man's inability to find security in the western world. Loneliness, anxiety, depression, neurosis are prevalent, negating man's attempts at dignity, stability, and happiness.⁵⁹

In response, advocates of community organization have attempted to develop "(1) meaningful functional communities as members of which individual citizens may have some sense of belonging and control over their environment, and (2) a new sense of neighborhood in the large metropolitan area through creation of citizens' councils and other forms of neighborhood organization."⁶⁰ Organized communities are able to accommodate change with less disruption than if it were imposed on them, and involvement in social change can be therapeutic for the community as well as the individual.

There is a recognition that successfully working through one problem will increase a community's capacity to deal with other problems with which it may later have to cope. This implies that a community may develop problem-solving techniques and capacities in dealing with one problem which stand it in good stead when it confronts new problems in the community. . . . Similarly, we are coming to recognize that the community that can be involved in a process by which it deals with one of its common problems may be involved in a process of self-understanding and integration that will make it possible to extend the range and scope of the problems with which it can deal successfully. This hypothesis has not been documented for the community as yet, but it is a firm conviction of many workers who have watched individuals and groups grow in their capacity to function in community projects.⁶¹

⁵⁸Murray G. Ross, Community Organization: Theory and Practice

⁵⁹Ibid., 5.

⁶⁰Ibid., 6.

⁶¹Ibid., 37.

Again, community organizers perform the role of therapists for the community. It is their task to employ the methods whereby a project or change becomes "meaningful, fully used and valued," "an object of identification for the people who are to use and value it."⁶² They help individuals and communities achieve integration simultaneously.

Participation strategies in the interest of integration induce people to confer legitimacy upon existing and evolving patterns of social stratification and differentiation. But, in a society premised upon the value of equality, dissatisfaction with the existing distribution of advantages and disadvantages, culminating in conflict over the rules of the game which buttress that distribution, would seem to be inevitable. As Dahrendorf points out, "the system of inequality that we call social stratification is only a secondary consequence of the social structure of power."⁶³ With this as his assumption, he reasons:

This would mean that the system of stratification always tends to its own abolition. The assumption that those who are less favorably placed in society will strive to impose a system of norms that promises them a better rank is certainly more plausible and fruitful than the assumption that the poor in reputation and wealth will love their society for its justice.⁶⁴

In his view, "inequality becomes the dynamic impulse that serves to keep social structures alive."

Inequality always implies the gain of one group at the expense of others; thus every system of social stratification generates protest against its principles and bears the seeds of its own suppression. Since human society without inequality is not realistically possible and the complete abolition of inequality is therefore ruled out, the intrinsic explosiveness of every system of social stratification confirms the general view that there cannot be an ideal, perfectly just, and therefore non-historical human society.⁶⁵

For advocates of integration, this "intrinsic explosiveness" is the problem, and they recommend social therapy; for advocates of goal attainment it is part of the solution, and they recommend disruptive rather than adjustive strategies.

⁶² Ibid., 36.

⁶³ R. Dahrendorf, "On the Origin of Inequality Among Men," in Andre Beteille, ed., Social Inequality (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), 38.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 41.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 42.

GOAL ATTAINMENT

Goal attainment frequently requires collective action: "it entails both the selection of goals and the mobilization of resources for their achievement." Thus, "(m)echanisms or processes are required to resolve conflicts among goals."⁶⁶ A good description of citizen participation oriented toward attaining a goal is contained in a paper prepared by Junius Williams, Executive Director of Newark Housing Council for the National Academy of Public Administration.⁶⁷ In it he describes his efforts and those of his associates to correct Newark's severe housing shortage. Having decided that they could be most effective by forcing the city to meet its obligations under the urban renewal program to provide an adequate supply of relocation housing, they mobilized the assistance of lawyers from NAACP Legal Defense Fund, architects from the Yale School of Architecture, the Newark Area Planning Association (a black community group), (and shortly after the Newark riots), they entered negotiations then underway between the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry and Newark city officials over a site for a new campus. As a result of these negotiations, community residents won the right to form a "broad based umbrella organization" to supervise the development of housing on sixty-three acres of urban renewal and to play a larger role in the Model Cities program. Evaluating his experience in each of these efforts, Williams describes why the Model Cities Neighborhood Council failed to become an effective vehicle for achieving housing goals and by what steps the Housing Council became an influential body.

After a single community-based effort to form the Model Cities Neighborhood Council was declared illegal by HUD, the city Model Cities agency supervised an election in which five thousand area residents voted for fifty-two Council members, electing forty blacks, six whites and six Puerto Ricans. From the start the Council experienced racial divisions. The city administration divided it further by offering its members jobs with the city. Williams, who was chairman, states that he was unable to muster "a fighting majority," and consequently, the council never used its veto power. Lacking staff assistance, council members could do little more than rubber-stamp plans prepared by the Newark Community Development Agency. Williams reports, "After attempting to work with the Council for some time, I finally resigned. The Council represented citizen participation in name only."⁶⁸

The Housing Council, on the other hand, underwent several false starts. Eventually, however, members of the Council were nominated from among those community leaders who attended a meeting establishing membership procedures, and elected by six hundred community residents. Williams and his associates in the Newark Area Planning Association (NAPA) campaigned vigorously for their slate of candidates, and Williams was among those elected. Of the twenty-five elected, all were black, and ten were Williams' allies, the rest being divided into smaller factions. NAPA won three of the principal offices and concentrated upon developing a working majority on the Council.

⁶⁷ Junius Williams, "The Impact of Citizen Participation," paper prepared for the National Academy of Public Administration, Washington, D.C., May 1970.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 7.



Unable to function for two months for lack of a quorum, Williams' faction changed the by-laws at the first opportunity, lowering the quorum requirement, and henceforth had a viable majority. After further difficulties, the Council finally turned to strengthening its position in relation to the Newark Housing Authority, establishing guidelines for housing development, marshalling financial assistance, and gathering authority and staff resources so that it could supervise implementation as well as planning; and after a year of preliminaries, it began to realize its objectives. To Williams, the Housing Council "represents an attempt by a community institution to break up (the Housing Authority's) hold on land and bring housing under the control of the Black community. This means diffusing the power held by City Hall and the Housing Authority in one aspect of city life."⁶⁹

The Housing Council differed from the Model Cities Neighborhood Council in several respects. For one thing, "there was not ultimate arbiter to decide whether the Newark Housing Council was correct or incorrect in its formation process." Williams reports:

The (Housing) Council grew and its members grew with it. We learned, and are learning (a) how to forge meaningful coalitions among diverse individuals, and (b) how to go about building houses. This is valuable in all aspects of personal growth and inter-personal relations. It has introduced us to the definition of creative (instead of negative) Black Power.⁷⁰

The Council has quieted its internal dissenters and maintained the support of its constituents. Williams writes:

Many of us came to the Council with constituencies of our own, and hence, were in viable, (to the extent we keep these constituencies; unlike city hall, our "good works" must win us friends and supporters as opposed to patronage and other handouts. Housing will not be in the ground for many months, so we rely upon our reputations for honesty and the ability to get things done, to keep support in the community.)⁷¹

The Model Cities Neighborhood Council, on the other hand, was prevented by HUD from generating its own organizational structure by what Williams bitterly regards as a betrayal of a negotiated agreement. ("We were given one chance at setting up a representative council (which we did) and when the community failed to conform to the rules of the Great White Father(s) in Washington, (to wit, the wrong class of people participated) our wrists were slapped and the opportunity taken away. When the right to form the Council was given to the Model Cities agency, we knew then that HUD had betrayed us.")⁷² After its large election turnout, the Model Cities Neighborhood Council, "controlled by a somewhat paranoid and co-opted majority, decided to practically outlaw any neighborhood participation by the people who were not finally chosen to serve for one or two years on the neighborhood Council. By this I mean that outsiders were excluded from meetings, and now must seek special permission a week in advance to come to a meeting. There is no real report-back process to the community."⁷³ As of May, 1970, Williams sums up

⁶⁹ Ibid., 20.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 26. .

⁷¹ Ibid., 28-9.

⁷² Ibid., 24-5.

⁷³ Ibid., 21.

the relative achievements of the two bodies in this way:

. . . Model Cities, with over \$900,000 in planning money, with all its "efficiency," has created only one program in Newark of any substance. This is a rat control program. The Housing Council, on the other hand, received a planning grant only on January 17, 1970, and already had done extensive nuts and bolts planning for some 1,000 units of housing plus commercial, community and educational facilities; the ground-breaking for this will occur sometime in early 1971, ahead of any Model Cities housing program. "Institutional changes" will not come within Model Cities, due to participation. The Housing Council, on the other hand, has (a) forced land out of an urban renewal housing agency, (b) gotten cooperation from this agency, (c) obtained a seed-money loan and a mortgage guarantee in excess of \$30 million from a state agency, and (d) focused the attention of Newark and the nation on Black people at work (not protesting, but creating.)⁷⁴

What is the significance of Williams's experience for this discussion of citizen participation? First of all, since Williams is an activist, the nature of the criteria he applies to citizen participation differ markedly from those used in the previous sections. He used citizen participation in order to alter the city's housing policy, not to acquire benevolent feelings toward an administration that reneged on its obligation to provide sufficient relocation housing. He strove for personal and organizational integration in order to facilitate the achievement of his goal, not as an end in itself. Thus, he allowed time for internal "politicking" before the Housing Council engaged its opponents. It is apparent from his experience that citizen participation does not replace public policy in solving the problems of the poor; he and his associates won inclusion in the Medical School negotiations and the right to supervise housing development because HUD housing policy prescribes that replacement housing be built.

The structure of the Housing Council was not prescribed by statute, but was formed by trial and error after the city agreed that it would recognize such a body. The Council depended for its survival upon maintaining community support; otherwise, its delegated authority would revert to the city. The structure of the Model Cities Neighborhood Council, on the other hand, was outlined by HUD and the city Model Cities agency. Its survival did not depend upon maintaining community support; and without community support, it could not control its own members or prevent the city from retracting its delegated authority in practice if not on paper. The procedures used to form the Model Cities Neighborhood Council were more "democratic" than those used to form the Housing Council: more people participated, nominations were not controlled, more representatives were chosen, some racial balance was achieved. Nevertheless, it failed to meet the housing needs of its constituents. Williams judges an organization by its performance as well as its procedures; thus, referring to the Housing Council, he writes: "We at the Council are firm believers in participation, but not to the extent that it (adversely) affects program output."⁷⁵ He quit the Model Cities Neighborhood Council when it became apparent that despite its veto powers, it would accomplish little. He helped form the Housing Council on a different democratic model,

⁷⁴Ibid., 27-8.

⁷⁵Ibid., 27.

one which holds that leaders must be continuously responsive to the needs and desires of their supporters rather than one which holds that leaders once elected need not be accountable until the next election. The very contingency of the Housing Council's existence required to make progress toward its housing goals; the Model Cities Neighborhood Council members were freer to pursue personal objective which made realization of their collective purpose more difficult if not impossible.

Finally, from his account, it is apparent that Williams and his associates were engaged in a power struggle with the Addonizio administration. Since that administration was not meeting the housing needs of Newark's black population, they wanted to take some housing responsibilities away from the city's housing agency and give them to a black community organization. They used citizen participation to force an otherwise reluctant administration to serve their needs. Citizen participation might also be used to achieve shared goals, but the goals do not appear to have been shared in this instance. Thus, mobilizing resources that could force the city to share its authority and permit the Housing Council to function effectively became a crucial activity for Williams and his associates. Significantly, they turned for assistance to other levels of government as well as to private and personal sources.

Most studies of citizen participation, I believe, fall into one of these categories. I have not meant to imply that strategies aimed at one of these goals is superior to those aimed at others (although the reader will no doubt detect my admiration of those who use participation strategies to attain redistributive goals). I have merely wanted to alert students of participation to how their goals constrain their analyses of citizen participation strategies and what considerations they ignore in adopting different perspectives. It should be apparent from the discussion so far that social scientists' normative orientations can be an important constraint upon the rate and effectiveness of participation when their analyses provide the basis for public policy initiatives.

C. Structural Determination of Political Participation

So far, in this review of the literature on participation, participation has been treated as a dependent variable determined by the social and psychological characteristics of individuals and their strategic calculations. Relatively few investigations have treated the rate and effectiveness of participation as dependent variables determined by aspects of political structure. Nevertheless, it seems quite plausible to assume that particular structural features discourage some groups from participation because they limit their opportunities for success. In this section I shall examine studies using structural variables to explain aspects of urban politics. The four types of structural and dependent variables dealt with are:

<u>Structural Variables</u>	<u>Dependent Variables</u>
Internal organizational characteristics	Characteristics and effectiveness of organizational members
Local political variables	Power and affluence of organization
Local political structure	Distribution of benefits between classes with a community
Regional political structure	Distribution of benefits between races within a region

1. Local political variables: Greenstone and Peterson

In "Reformers, Machines and the War on Poverty," J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson examine the impact of machine and reform institutions upon the conduct of the poverty program in four cities: Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles.⁷⁶ The mayors in each of these cities "regarded poverty as an economic condition and resisted those in OEO who sought to disperse political power." Suffering under financial constraints, they welcome economic assistance in dealing with poverty, but resisted political organization of the poor who might then make additional demands on their limited resources. ("Even worse, these demands of new autonomous organizations would antagonize other urban interests and weaken the mayor's own position.") Thus, they tried to increase their control over the program as it was getting under way, but, in so doing, they encountered resistance from the national OEO, local newspapers, and various reform groups who supported the dispersal of power to the poor.

The authors test the hypothesis that: "The federal agency would presumably be most successful in distributing power to the poor in reform cities, given the existing dispersion of power. On the other hand, machine cities would probably be more successful at distributing material resources."⁷⁷ They found a curvilinear relations between the dispersion of power within a city and the distribution of power to the poor instead of the direct relationship they had hypothesized. They speculate: "this curvilinear

⁷⁶ J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, "Reformers, Machines, and the War on Poverty," in City Politics and Public Policy (New York: Wiley, 1968), 267-92.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 278.

relationship was produced by the unexpectedly complex effect of power dispersion on the mayor's resources, the mayor's interests, and the flow of demand imputs.⁷⁸

The mayor's resources: "The stronger the party organization, the greater the resources of the mayor in bargaining with other political actors."⁷⁹

The mayor's interests: The political situation of the mayor determined whether or not it was in his interest to encourage political organization by the poor. "Where power was centralized, as in Chicago, the mayor's primary goal was to maintain the party organization which kept him in power. His machine, which had been the sole significant political force in the low-income areas, did not welcome the growth of independent neighborhood organizations." But, "new community organizations in low-income areas are probably least threatening to reform mayors such as Lindsay who are elected over the opposition of a political machine that has not been completely destroyed."⁸⁰ "In Los Angeles, unlike New York, power is so dispersed that the mayor has little to gain by a further distribution of power to low-income groups. . . . No political considerations, in other words, offset the manifold ways in which autonomous community groups could create new administrative problems for the mayor of a large city."⁸⁰

The flow of demand imputs: "A curvilinear relationship also obtained between the dispersion of political power and the articulation of opposition demands. Centralized power in Chicago prevented opposition demands from flowing easily through the system. . . . In Philadelphia, and still more in New York, less concentrated political power enabled private welfare agencies, Republican reformers, and leading newspapers to support neighborhood groups seeking power for themselves. . . .

"In Los Angeles, on the other hand, the extreme dispersal of political power actually handicapped the demands of the neighborhood groups for more power. . . . The disorganization of the city's political and social structures left the opposition with few channels through which their demands could flow."⁸¹

The authors did find a linear relationship between the strength of party organization (centralization of power) and "both the amount of federal funding and the speed and efficiency with which local agencies were established to disburse the funds." As for intervening variables, they suggest:

All mayors felt it was in their interest to obtain as much money as possible and to spend it as quickly as possible. In this way favorable publicity would replace carping criticism. The key variable thus becomes the resources of the mayor to attain this goal, which, as we have seen, depended directly on the dispersion of political power within the city.⁸²

⁷⁸ Ibid., 282.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 283-5.

⁸¹ Ibid., 285-6.

⁸² Ibid., 288.

2. Internal Organizational Characteristics: Peterson

In a related study, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program," Paul E. Peterson argues that the formal arrangements for selecting representatives in the three cities he examined "reflected the balance of power between the mayor and organized voices of the black community," and in turn, influenced the social characteristics and effectiveness of those selected.⁸³ As reported in the previous study,

The neighborhood groups were in the strongest bargaining position in the New York City, because the political leader supervising the poverty program was seeking vital political support from liberal and civil rights organizations in a closely contested mayoral election. In Chicago the lack of significant opposition to a mayor supported by a powerful political machine deprived community groups of essential allies; anticipating the strength of their opponent, they failed to mount a sustained drive for greater control over the selection of representatives.⁸⁴

Both mayors and neighborhood groups "preferred a means of providing formal representation which they themselves could control." In Philadelphia the mayor and neighborhood groups compromised on an elaborate election procedure when neither was able to win control over the selection process.

Guided by Hannah Pitkin's clarification of the concept of representation, Peterson distinguishes several types of representation: formal representation--the directness with which the representative is selected; actual representation--the amount of influence exercised by the representative's over the action program's operations; interest representation--the orientation of the representatives toward expanding their constituents' life-chances; and he found the following relationships among them in the cities he studied.

⁸³ Paul E. Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program," American Political Science Review, 64 (June 1970), 491-507.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 495-6.

TABLE I. 85

Formal Representation, Substantive Representation and Conflict in Chicago, Philadelphia and New York City

<u>Patterns of Political Action</u>	<u>Chicago</u>	<u>Philadelphia</u>	<u>New York</u>
1. Formal Representation	Low (Indirect via Mayor)	High (Direct elections)	Moderate (Indirect via neighborhood organizations)
2. Substantive Representation			
a. Actual Repr. (Influence)	Very low	Moderate and declining	High
b. Interest Representation (Orientation)	--	Particularistic	Universalistic
3. Conflict	Low	Mild	Organized and Extensive

His most important finding is that representatives who are selected by direct elections, as in Philadelphia, do not serve the interests of their constituents as effectively as representatives who are selected by indirect procedures which encourage continuing relationship between the representative and his constituents. In addition, he found support for the following hypotheses:

85 Ibid., 501.

1. Representation of universalistic interests of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:
 - a) an organized relationship between the formal representatives and the low status group, provided that this organizational link is not controlled by interests antithetical to those of the low status group.
 - b) political competition and conflict among those seeking to be the formal representatives of the low status group;
 - c) formal representatives who are related to the low status group in an organized manner, but who are not socially descriptive of the low status group with respect to such status variables as occupation, education and income; and
 - d) substantial influence by formal representatives over the operations of the relevant governmental program.
2. Representation of particularistic interests of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:
 - a) little organized competition for the position of formal representation together with selection of representatives more for their personal qualities than for their position on political issues;
 - b) few, if any, organizational mechanisms systematically linking formal representatives to their constituencies as a whole;
 - c) ample opportunities for the distribution to constituents of divisible material benefits by the formal representatives;
 - d) moderate influence over the operations of the relevant governmental program by formal representatives; and
 - e) formal representatives who are socially descriptive of the low status group with respect to status variables.
3. Representation of scarcely any substantive interests--either particularistic or universalistic--of low status groups is associated with the occurrence of:
 - a) a relationship between the formal representatives and the low status group which is organized by an interest contrary to those of the low status group; if this factor is present, other variables are unlikely to affect significantly the character of substantive representation.⁸⁶

Interestingly, Peterson considers "the possibility that formal arrangements had no significant effect on the influence and orientations of the representatives of the poor": these arrangements may merely have reflected the power relationship between the city government and community organizations. He rejects this possibility because the participants themselves regarded the arrangements as crucial, and because he is able to show that the arrangements shaped a constituency for the representatives which in turn influenced the patterns of substantive representation.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Ibid., 506.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 501.

3. Local Political Structure: Hays Compared with Banfield and Wilson

In "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," Samuel P. Hays generalizes his research on Pittsburgh reformers into an explanation for municipal reform which differs substantially from that presented by Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson in City Politics. I shall present each of the arguments in some detail.

Banfield and Wilson sharply contrast "public-regarding" reformers with "private-regarding" machine politicians. Defining a political machine as "a party organization that depends crucially upon inducements that are both specific and material,"⁸⁸ they reason, "The machine, therefore, is apolitical: it is interested only in making and distributing income--mainly money--to those who run and work for it. Political principle is foreign to it, and represents a danger and a threat to it."⁸⁹

The existence of the machine depends upon its ability to control votes. This control becomes possible when people place little or no value on their votes, or, more precisely, when they place a lower value on their vote than they do on the things which the machine can offer them in exchange for them. The voter who is indifferent to issues, principles, or candidates puts little or no value on his vote and can be induced relatively easily (or cheaply) to put it at the machine's disposal.⁹⁰

Thus, their independent variable accounting for the shift from machine to reform government is the value a voter attaches to his vote. Lower-class voters, unfamiliar with American ways and institutions, supported the machine; but, when they entered the middle class, they learned to value their vote more; they assimilated "the political ethos of the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant elite, the central idea of which is that politics should be based on public rather than on private motives, and accordingly, should stress the virtues of honesty, impartiality, and efficiency."⁹¹ Machines declined when voters valued their vote more than the inducements the machines offered.

Banfield and Wilson rest their interpretation of municipal reform upon imputed motives and make it clear that they prefer one set of motives to the other:

It goes without saying that a system of government based upon specific, material inducements is wholly at odds with that conception of democracy which says that decisions ought to be made on the basis of reasonable discussion about what the common good requires. Machine government is, essentially, a system of organized bribery. The destruction of machines would therefore be good if it did no more than to permit government on

⁸⁸ Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), 115.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 116.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 116-7.

⁹¹ Ibid., 123.

on the basis of appropriate motives, that is, public-regarding ones. In fact, it has other highly desirable consequences--especially greater honesty, impartiality, and (in routine matters) efficiency.⁹²

However, their own evidence supports a different interpretation. They argue that:

Almost without exception, the lower the average income and the fewer the average years of schooling in a ward, the more dependable the ward's allegiance to the machine. As one moves out from the river and the railroad yards first into lower-middle-class districts, and then into middle-class ones, and finally (usually in the suburbs beyond the city proper) into upper-middle-class territory, fewer and fewer precincts are manned and the ties to the machine become fewer and weaker until they cease to exist.⁹³

One might conclude that support for the machine is a function of the rational calculation of class interests rather than lack of sophistication. Hays makes an argument along these lines. He suggests that machines did not "decline" because their supporters became assimilated into the middle class, but were defeated by groups within the city who were dissatisfied with the pattern of benefits from local government.

In analyzing the Progressives, Hays distinguishes between their ideology and their political behavior, on the ground that reform ideology is not an accurate description of reform practice. He also asserts that it is not sufficient to say that the Progressives were middle-class reformers, since most other leaders were middle-class, too. Based upon a study of Pittsburgh reformers, he concludes that "the source of support for reform in municipal government did not come from the lower or middle classes, but from the upper class."⁹⁴ Almost half of the reformers in Pittsburgh were professional men and fifty-two per cent were bankers, corporation officials, and their wives. Both groups of reformers came from the vanguard of their professions: "Professional men involved in reform. . . seem to have come especially from the more advanced segments of their professions, from those who sought to apply their specialized knowledge to a wider range of public affairs;"⁹⁵ whereas the businessmen "represented not the old business community, but industries which had developed and grown primarily within the past fifty years and which had come to dominate the city's economic life."⁹⁶ They became interested in municipal reform because of developments in the economy and the city.

These business, professional, and upper-class groups who dominated municipal reform movements were all involved in the rationalization and systemization of modern life; they wished a form of government which would be more consistent with the objectives inherent in those developments. The most important single feature of their perspective was the rapid expansion of the geographical scope of affairs which they wished to influence and manipulate, a scope which was no longer limited and narrow, no longer within the confines of pedestrian communities.

⁹² Ibid., 125.

⁹³ Ibid., 118.

⁹⁴ Samuel Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quarterly (October 1964), 159.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 158.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 160.

but was not broad and city-wide, covering the whole range of activities of the metropolitan area.⁹⁷

Given their policy concerns, the reformers objected to the structure of governments which enabled local and particularistic interests to dominate."⁹⁸

These particularistic interests were the focus of a decentralized political life. City councilmen were local leaders. They spoke for their local areas, the economic interests of their inhabitants, their residential concerns, their educational, recreational, and religious interests--i.e., for those aspects of community life which mattered most to those they represented.⁹⁸

Hays points out that

The ward system of government especially gave representation in city affairs to lower and middle-class groups. Most elected ward officials were from these groups, and they, in turn, constituted the major opposition to reforms in municipal government. In Pittsburgh, for example, immediately prior to the changes in both the city council and the school board in 1911 in which city-wide representation replaced ward representation, only 24 per cent of the 387 members of those bodies represented the same managerial, professional, and banker occupations which dominated the membership of the Civic Club and the Voters' League. The great majority (67 per cent) were small businessmen--groups, saloon-keepers, livery-stable proprietors, owners of small hotels, druggists--white-collar workers such as clerks and bookkeepers, and skilled and unskilled workers.⁹⁹

Conflict between these sharply divergent groups took the form of an attack on the "machine." "When reformers attacked the 'machine' as the most visible institutional element of the ward system, they attacked the entire ward form of political organization and the political power of lower and middle-income groups which lay behind it"¹⁰⁰--they proposed to replace it with primaries and direct elections, and the initiative, referendum, and recall. However, Hays contends, "behind the debate over the method of representation. . . lay a debate over who should be represented, over whose views of public policy should prevail."¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Ibid., 161.

⁹⁸ Ibid..

⁹⁹ Ibid., 162.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 163

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 162.

During the period when the lower and middle class controlled the formal power of municipal government, industrialism was advancing. Business leaders

. . . frequently found that city officials did not accept their views of what was best for the city and what direction municipal policies should take. They had developed a common outlook, closely related to their economic activities, that the city's economic expansion should become the prime concern of municipal government, and yet they found that this view had to compete with even more influential views of public policy.¹⁰²

Thus, they resorted to bribery and corruption to secure the accommodations they required.

These accommodations, however, proved to be burdensome and unsatisfactory to the business community and to the upper third of socioeconomic groups in general. They were expensive; they were wasteful; they were uncertain. Toward the end of the 19th century, therefore, businessmen and professional men sought direct control over municipal government in order to exercise political influence more effectively. They realized their goals in the early 20th century in the new commission and city-manager forms of government and in the shift from ward to city-wide representation.¹⁰³

In creating support for these new structures, the reformers used the ideology of expanding popular involvement in decision-making, but "they were in practice shaping the structure of municipal government so that political power would no longer be distributed, but would in fact be more centralized in the hands of a relatively small segment of the population."¹⁰⁴ Hays finds

. . . little evidence that the ideology represented a faith in a purely democratic system of decision-making or that reformers actually wished, in practice, to substitute direct democracy as a continuing system of sustained decision-making in place of the old. It was used to destroy the political power which those institutions gave rise to, rather than to provide a clear-cut guide for alternative action.¹⁰⁵

Whereas Banfield and Wilson make their argument by imputing moral promises to poorly defined classes, Hays examines how each of the parties to the conflict over reform proposed to use local political authority. Once this examination is made, the distinction between private- and public-regardingness dissolves. It becomes apparent that both reformers and machine politicians supported the politices which promised to benefit them, and thus there is no need to this invidious distinction. In Hays analysis, structural reform becomes a means for altering the rate and effectiveness with which different social classes participate in government. Particularly noteworthy is the importance he attaches to the creation and destruction of institutions which mobilize participants and enhance their likelihood of success.

¹⁰² Ibid., 166.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 167.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 168.



(Most intriguing to me is the possibility that, in cities at the present time, a new period of structural reform has begun, and that this one, too, is occurring under an ideological cover of increasing citizen involvement; but whereas the Progressive reform movement was propelled by the need to adjust municipal political institutions to changes in the economic structure brought on by industrialism, this one is propelled by the need to adjust them to post-industrialism.¹⁰⁶ As a consequence of Progressive reforms, the state assumed responsibility for maintaining the conditions within which free enterprise could flourish--it curbed unfair competitive practices and provided supportive infrastructure.¹⁰⁷ Contemporary movements (e.g. civil rights, ecology, consumer protection) demand that the state assume greater responsibility for maintaining the welfare of citizens and consumers. In urban area, the agents of social change would appear to be black political leaders and their allies among professionals (and, if the neo-Marxists are correct, some corporate liberals who promote social reform in order to reduce challenges to their positions of dominance).^{108a} Present and future black mayors and their administrations have to reconcile prevailing goals of economic growth with their own goals of racial equality and political and economic redistribution. Like the Progressives, they value local governmental authority as a means to their objectives. Unlike the Progressives, they do not control the resources that they require for success. When the Progressives captured control of municipal governments, local governments were capable of financing the public building programs (via property taxes and bond issues) that they initiated, (social welfare was still largely a private responsibility), but local governments today increasingly rely for social welfare and capital improvement resources upon county, state, and federal governments, and metropolitan special districts (e.g., the Bay Area Rapid Transit District). Thus, their discretion is reduced, and they are vulnerable to deliberate efforts to reduce their power. (In the following section, I describe Piven and Cloward's perception of one such effort). Nevertheless, if the resource problem were eliminated, under leaders informed by a new ideology, cities might undergo physical and social reconstruction comparable to that which occurred in the Progressive Era. The potentiality exists that the future of central cities, left to multi-colored minorities and the very poor and the very rich (who retain business headquarters and, in some case, residences in the central cities) need not be as dismal and bedraggled as most commentators have predicted. But most probably, racism and status jealousy will prevail over creative vision and deflect the required re-invigoration of national will.)

¹⁰⁶ Judith V. May, "Progressives and the Poor: An Analytic History of Oakland," paper prepared for the Conference on "Public Administration and Neighborhood Control," sponsored by the Center for Governmental Studies, at Boulder, Colorado, May 6-8, 1970.

¹⁰⁷ Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1963, 1967).

^{108a} See James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

4. Regional Political Structure: Piven and Cloward

Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward argue that regional government is being introduced in metropolitan areas, regardless of the preferences of voters, by the federal government which, through conditions attached to grants-in-aid, "is beginning to force localities to subordinate themselves to new area-wide planning bureaucracies."^{108b} They predict:

The autonomy of local government will not be the only casualty of administrative metropolitanism; Negroes will be losers too. The black masses are now building to electoral majorities in the larger American cities, but the promise of urban political power will be frustrated, for the new administrative government will be responsive to a majority coalition of suburban and inner-city wishes. As blacks rise to power in the city, the city will lose power to the metropolis.¹⁰⁹

From requiring area-wide planning for particular functions, the federal government is moving toward requiring "multi-functional plans as a conditions of aid for a single project."¹¹⁰ In the future the authors anticipate that:

. . . the metro agency will be the hub of a network of administrative relationships linking the federal government to a host of local and state agencies. Each of these agencies will have to produce a plan conforming to federal guidelines in order to receive federal money, and the metro agency will be authorized to assess the plans. The metro agency will be the control point in an all-embracing bureaucratic system.¹¹¹

While conceding that some problems require regional solutions, Piven and Cloward contend that "local governments could make considerable progress on many problems without waiting to act in concert. . . Communities fail to deal with many of these problems, not for lack of area-wide planning and coordination, but for lack of political will."¹¹² Demographic changes in metropolitan areas and the growing electoral importance of the suburbs have induced national Democratic (and Republican) administrations to support regional government.

The more the city becomes poor and black, the more the suburbs may be expected to withhold allegiance from a national party which speaks for the city. Class and racial cleavages in metropolitan areas thus foreshadow the next axis of antagonism in American politics: major alignments of the future will not be North vs South or rural vs urban, but city vs suburb. To retain its majorities, a national Democratic administration must find a way to hold together the conflict-ridden cities, to garner support in the suburbs, and somehow to avert the political expression of the schism between core and suburb. And that promises to be no small feat.¹¹³

To do so, the Democratic administration fashioned grant-in-aid programs for
^{108b} See James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

¹⁰⁹ Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "Black Control of Cities: I," The New Republic, 157 (September 30, 1967), 19-20.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 20.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 21.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid.

both core cities and the suburbs, but these programs frequently encountered resistance. Given the proximity of local government to the voters, these programs can be blocked by local dissenting groups and by the reluctance of central city administrations still dominated by white ethnic groups to implement federal programs intended for ghetto residents. Thus, the federal government is creating a metropolitan administrative apparatus to circumvent local resistance to its programs and describe the advantages of "planning" for overcoming resistance. The authors argue that 'the language and strategy of planning are serving to centralize power for political ends.' What is more, these events are occurring as a result of trial and error rather than plan or conspiracy. "As each election reveals strains within a constituency, one or another palliative is put forward."¹¹⁴

Local government has not been notably generous to the poor and minorities, but this situation promises to change as blacks win control of cities. However, their victory will most probably increase racial conflict. Piven and Cloward speculate: "If the federal government is to prevent the exacerbation of racial conflict in urban areas, the political repercussions of impending black control of the cities must be averted. Metropolitan government will help to achieve that end by usurping many powers of the city."¹¹⁵ The authors offer underlined advice to blacks in view of this development, but pessimistically doubt that they are in a position to follow it:

What, then, are Negroes to do? Were they a cohesive and disciplined political force, they might use their great numbers in the city to impede metropolitan reorganization. Although metropolitanism is probably inevitable, its growth can be slowed and its form modified. As the price for their cooperation, blacks could demand their share of space in the cities, massive investments in housing and education, and programs to guarantee employment and income. Of more long-run importance, they would bargain to retain substantial power for the municipal government to which they will soon fall heir. They could insist on the right to veto major metropolitan decisions, resisting arrangements in which the central cities are granted one vote along with each suburban township--as is typical in "metropolitan councils of governments."¹¹⁶

In their concluding remarks, the authors stress that federal administrations formulate policy in order to create constituencies as well as to respond to their demands, and changes in political structure are frequently manipulated with this intent.

... (T)he intricacies of electoral districting and of allocations of power to various units of government in the federal system are neither accidental nor simply reflections of popular will. These structural arrangements are the object of continuous maneuvering by political incumbents to divide, aggregate and weigh the plebiscite so as to form the electoral majorities which keep them in power. Through its expanding role in local affairs, the national administration is reshaping the federal system, preempting local powers, and aggregating white majorities in order to rebuild a Democratic urban coalition.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "Black Control of Cities: II," 157 (October 7, 1967), 17.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 18.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 19.

Although this article, originally written for the New Republic, is political commentary, and thus differs from much of the literature reviewed in this paper, it nevertheless contains many interesting hypotheses which merit further investigation, and most importantly, for my purposes, it displays fine sensitivity to the importance of structural variables, however accurate the argument may turn out to be.

* * * * *

Even though they have dealt only with urban politics, these studies, I believe, demonstrate that structural variables frequently determine whether citizens will have opportunities to participate and how effective they will be. What is more, they indicate that changes in political structure are frequently undertaken to alter the pattern of benefits distributed by the political system. Unlike socio-psychological studies of participation, studies of this sort seldom consider rates of participation apart from their impact on policy outcomes. Rather, they frequently investigate changes in the relationship between political and economic structures and policy outcomes. Historical studies of such changes may generate predictions about what will become of contemporary demands for new institutions for increased citizen participation.

II. Administrative Participation

A. Participation and Organizational Effectiveness

Some organization theorists recommend participation as a strategy for improving organizational effectiveness. In doing so, they raise the issue of the relationship between the goals of the organization and those of the individual. Is participation a strategy for increasing an organization's control over the individual or the individual's control over the organization? In this section, I shall summarize the views of four organization theorists; the Parsonian categories are as useful in this discussion of administrative participation as they were in the earlier discussion of political participation strategies.

Goal Attainment: Theodore Caplow. In Principles of Organization,¹ Theodore Caplow develops a sociological model of organizations, using as his key variables: Status (position), Interaction (role), Volition (norm) and Activity (goal). He assumes that these variables are in an interdependent equilibrium: a change in one variable, other things being equal, necessitates compensatory changes in other variables. Presently, in organizations, Status (stratification) is declining. Consequently, to maintain the same or greater levels of Achievement, increases in Integration and Volition are required. This is accomplished in some organizations by increasing the members' sense of participation. However, a paradox results: quasi-democratic, participatory methods are used to increase the organization's control over the individual.² Caplow rejects hypocritical uses of participatory techniques to secure acceptance of predetermined goals. Furthermore, he sees little possibility of reconciling the goals of individuals and organizations. In some detail, he demonstrates that individuals and organizations see the same problem differently.³ For example, in an organization with excessive Stratification, the individual experiences coercion, the organization anticipates rebellion; with excessive Integration, the individual fears loss of autonomy, the organization deflection of goals; with excessive demand for Achievement, the individual experiences exploitation, the organization turnover and absenteeism. Each of these organizational problems is more characteristic of some levels of hierarchy than others. These conflicts between individual and organizational are rooted in organizational structure, and, as Caplow points out in an interesting chapter on utopian organizations, removal of these conflicts severely reduces the freedom of the individual and the achievements of the organization.


Integration: Chris Argyris. Chris Argyris, on the other hand, in Integrating the Individual and the Organization,⁴ argues that conflicts between the individual and the organization can be eliminated in an organizational context which encourages individual growth and self-actualization. An individual's principal input into an organization is psychological energy. The amount of this energy is determined by the individual's level of self-esteem which in turn varies with the supportiveness of the social system in which he functions and with his opportunities to

¹Theodore Caplow, Principles of Organization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1964).

²Ibid., 156.

³Ibid., 264.

⁴Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: Wiley, 1964).



experience psychological success. He experiences psychological success when he is able to define his own goals, choose the means to those goals, pursue goals related to his needs, and maintain a realistic level of aspiration. This he can do only in a setting which encourages self-responsibility and self-control, commitment, productiveness, work, and use of his more important abilities. Not all organizations provide such opportunities. Argyris believes that nonhierarchical structure provide settings which encourage integrating individual and organizational goals. In making this argument, he relies upon the psychological theories of Maslow and Rogers who posit a hierarchy of human needs. Authoritarian and coercive structures do not allow men to fulfill their higher needs for creativity, self-direction, and self-fulfillment. In a near-Marxian manner, modern man experiences alienation from the fruits of his labor. Men can overcome this alienation through involvement in their work. When they become more involved, they invest more psychological energy into the organization and increase its effectiveness. Argyris sees no inherent conflict between the goals of the individual and those of the organization.

Adaptation: Rensis Likert.⁵ Likert bases his conception of the relationship between the individual and the organization upon the social psychology of Lewin. Individuals are more likely to be good workers if they are members of supportive work groups and have a sense of participation in the organization. It is the task of supervisors to adopt group-centered techniques, to interpret the organizational tasks in terms of the needs, desires, and attitudes of the individuals under his supervision, and to represent them effectively at higher levels of the organization. Likert does not see any conflicts between individuals and the organization that are not susceptible to integrative resolutions.

Socialization: Alexander Leighton. In The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp,⁶ Leighton reminds administrators that they must take into account the cultural understandings, values, and sentiments of the population that is being administered if they want to maintain order with a minimum of coercion. Like the other organization theorists, he focuses on the relationship between the goals of individuals and the organization, but it would be difficult to argue that the goals of the prisoner "participants" and their administrators can be integrated except on a narrow mutual interest in order and negotiated conflict-resolution.

Each of the theorists examined sees participation from a slightly different perspective. Caplow regrets the manipulativeness of participation seen from the point of view of the participant; Likert discusses this manipulative behavior from the point of view of management. Argyris argues that the interests of the individual and the organization can be made congruent through participation; Leighton documents that the range of congruity can, in some instances, be very narrow indeed. Whether the

⁵ Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

⁶ Alexander Leighton, The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945).

"organization" is a public bureaucracy or the state, these issues arise when participation is under discussion. Participation is so frequently assimilated with "democracy" and treated as intrinsically valuable; these authors reveal the threat as well as the promise of participation.

B. Participation and Bureaucratic Responsiveness

Participation is sometimes recommended as a strategy for making bureaucracies more responsive to particular segments of the population or particular values. For example, as Martin Rein reports, the authors of the poverty program felt that bureaucracies were unresponsive to the needs of the poor because poor people were apathetic and did not hold the agencies accountable to them; thus, they included provisions to increase their power vis-à-vis bureaucracy.⁷ Before this strategy can be evaluated, it is necessary to know the conditions under which bureaucracies are responsive. What variables determine the likelihood that an agency will satisfy the claims of a particular group? Some of the growing literature on the relationship between an organization and its environment helps to clarify this issue and will be analyzed below. Then we will be in a position to explore the question: Under what conditions does citizen participation in administrative decision-making improve the responsiveness of an agency to the claims of particular groups?

Let us first focus upon the interaction between political resources and ideology in determining the responsiveness of a bureaucracy to particular groups. As a bare minimum, an agency needs resources sufficient for survival. The ease with which it can secure resources depends upon the place of its goals in the society's value structure and the amount of competition it faces for scarce resources. The following propositions describe how competition affects bureaucratic responsiveness.

Organizations competing for scarce resources differentiate themselves from one another in order to establish a claim to a task and the resources needed to perform it. As Clark and Wilson observe: "Each organization seeks to assert and maintain its autonomy or distinctive competence in order that it may lay unchallenged claim to a stock of potential incentives," and they define their terms as follows:

By autonomy we refer to the extent to which an organization possesses a distinctive area of competence, a clearly demarcated clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a function, service, goal, issue, or cause. Organizations seek to make their environments stable and certain and to remove threats to their identities. Autonomy gives an organization a reasonably stable claim to resources and thus places it in a more favorable position from which to compete for these resources. Resources include issues and causes as well as money, time, effort and names. The intensity of the competition for these can be viewed as a function of the scarcity of resources and the autonomy of the association. Competition increases as resources become more scarce and as the autonomy or jurisdiction of two or more organizations becomes less clear.⁸

Organizations competing for scarce resources also differentiate themselves in order to appeal to particular social groups and classes. Elling and Halebsky studied how short-term hospitals, competing for support in the form of funds, patients, and community participation, varied their internal

⁷Rein, op.cit., 5.

⁸Peter T. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, (September 1961), 129-66.

characteristics in order to appeal to potential sponsors. From their examination of 136 general hospitals in upstate New York, they learned that voluntary hospitals receive more funds than governmental hospitals. Both types of hospitals have business, industrial and society leaders on their boards; but voluntary hospitals "have not left any channel of formal control open to the public," whereas the city and county hospitals "have remained 'the people's' hospitals in the sense that popular control and identification have been partially retained through the election of local governmental officials." They suggest:

As a consequence of the class character of their control, voluntary and governmental hospitals experience differentials in support consistent with the distribution of rewards in society according to class position. Perhaps the relatively higher support received by the governmental hospital when it is the sole community hospital is due to there being less of a division of labor along social-class lines in such a setting than there is when the community's support must be divided among several hospitals.⁹

Their analysis alerts us to the likelihood that wealthier social groups may be served by wealthier organizations, that organizations seeking support may prefer wealthier clientele, and that a governing board's formal source of authority influences what groups the organization orients itself to serve.

Organizations competing for scarce resources respond to the performance criteria utilized by their supporters when allocating resources. Levine and White found that local agencies were unable to induce a state rehabilitation organization to respond to their needs.

The state organization, to justify its existence, has to present a successful experience to the legislators--that a minimum number of persons have been successfully rehabilitated. This means that by virtue of the services the organization has offered, a certain percentage of its debilitated clients are again returned to self-supporting roles. The rehabilitative goals of the organization cannot be fulfilled unless it is selective in the persons it accepts as clients. Other community agencies dealing with seriously debilitated clients are unable to get the state to accept their clients for rehabilitation. In the eyes of these frustrated agencies the state organization is remiss in fulfilling its public goal. The state agency, on the other hand, cannot commit its limited personnel and resources to the time-consuming task of trying to rehabilitate what seem to be very poor risks. The state agency wants to be accepted and approved by the local community and its health agencies, but the state legislature and the governor, being the primary source of the agency's resources, constitute its significant reference group. Hence, given the existing definition of the organizational goals and the state agency's relative independence of the local health system, its interaction with other community agencies is relatively low.¹⁰

⁹Ray H. Elling and Sandor Halebsky, "Organizational Differentiation and Support: A Conceptual Framework," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (1961), 206-7.

¹⁰Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," Administrative Science Quarterly, 5 (1961), 590-2.

Organizations that have relatively dependable sources of support resist efforts to coordinate their services with those offered by other organizations. Levine and White discovered that community health and welfare agencies negotiate a "domain consensus" when they must depend upon one another to secure adequate amounts of clients, labor services, and other resources. (A "domain consensus" is an agreement among organizations performing similar tasks which legitimizes each organization's claim to particular functions and to the resources required to perform them). Comparing corporate organizations "which delegate authority downward from the national or state level to the local level" with federated organizations "which delegate authority upwards--from the local to the state and national level," they found that "local member units of corporate organizations, because they are less dependent on the local health system and can obtain the necessary elements from the community or their parent organizations, interact less with other local agencies than federated organizations." Consequently, organization in the local health system cannot require these organizations to provide coordinated services.

Organizations that are dependent on one another's assistance to secure support are more willing to coordinate their efforts. Litwak and Hylton hypothesize that a voluntary organization's willingness to coordinate its activities with other voluntary organizations varies with its dependence on them: "Coordinating agencies will develop and continue in existence if formal organizations are partly interdependent; agencies are aware of this interdependence, and it can be defined in standardized units of action. They speculate that "if the development of coordinating agencies is a function of interdependency, then any fluctuation of interdependency should lead to a fluctuation in coordination,"

In other words, when an agency, by virtue of cultural norms (religious), historical tradition (Red Cross), or through current interest (American Cancer Society), is able to establish a "fixed money market," it is less dependent on other agencies in the community and can resist efforts at incorporation into community chest programs.

Where all relations are independent of the local community, the organizations will refuse affiliation with local community chests (e.g., American Cancer Society). Where there are mixed dependencies, the organization is likely to enter the community chests only on its own terms (i.e., eliminate conflicting organizations or run dual campaigns). Where the organization has multiple dependencies and they mostly involve interdependence, there will be strong support of local coordinating organizations.¹¹

¹¹Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (1962), 405-6, 407. Cf. Charles Perrow, "Organizational Prestige: Some Functions and Dysfunctions," American Journal of Sociology, 66 (1961), 335: "An organization may control its dependency upon the environment by acquiring prestige."

Two kinds of organization interdependence are identified by the authors: "competitive interdependence (where one agency can maximize its goal only at the expense of another)," and "facilitative interdependence (where two or more agencies can simultaneously maximize their goals)." Coordinating agencies dealing with competitive interdependence develop processes for "adjudicating" differences, whereas agencies dealing with facilitative interdependence do not need them.

Thus, as organizations become more dependent on other organizations or social groups and classes in their environment, they will become more responsive to their needs; and as resources become more scarce, they will become less responsive to the needs of those on whom they are not dependent. The following studies examine how an organization's autonomy or dependence affects its ability to realize its goals.

Eisenstadt identifies three possible relationships between an organization and its environment: bureaucratization, when an organization dominates its environment; autonomy, when neither an organization nor its environment dominates; and debureaucratization, when the environment dominates the organization. He prefers the autonomous relationship which produces "service bureaucracy." In the relation to social groups and classes in its environment, the bureaucracy retains its distinguishing (Weberian) characteristics and maintains a proper subservience to the political organs of the society. When an organization dominates these groups, it tends to regiment some areas of social life and to displace its service goals with power interests and orientations. When these groups dominate the organization, the bureaucracy subordinates its goals and activities to their interests.¹²

Debureaucratization, the condition when social groups in its environment dominate an organization, may undermine the organization's ability to protect "precarious values." Burton Clark argues that this is what happened to the adult education movement in California. "Social values tend to be precarious when they are undefined," "when the position of functionaries is not fully legitimized," and "when they are unacceptable to a 'host' population." "Similarly a value may be precarious within a formal organization because it ranks low relative to immediate competitors in extensiveness of its social support."

Secure values, then are, those that are clearly defined in behavior and strongly established in the minds of many. Such values literally take care of themselves. Precarious values, on the other hand, need deliberately intentioned agents, for they must be normatively defined, or social established, or both. Within a society, values that are precarious are likely to call forth a "movement," . . . for adherents must crusade to get their conceptions of the desirable accepted.

According to Clark, the values of adult education fit the definition of precarious values. Adult education is a marginal activity in the educational system. "Since marginality is a common condition, the appropriations process sets incentives for action in the direction of building attendance." The need

¹²S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, 4 (1959), 302-20.

to attract students "renders the adult school highly sensitive to public likes and dislikes." In the absence of well-defined values and "of specific missions from which standards and professional authority might flow," the adult education program becomes a service enterprise. "Acceptance (of the program) is sought on the basis of service rather than on intrinsic educational worth and professional competence."¹³

In a classic study, TVA and the Grass Roots, Selznick describes an organization which modified some of its objectives in order to win support from its environment. The TVA used the ideology of grass roots participation as a cover for selling out its original, progressive, agricultural and conservation objectives to the conservative, entrenched local interests.

It is freely stated among certain circles within the TVA that the H. A. Morgan-Lilienthal bloc was a "log-rolling" enterprise, whereby Lilienthal received support for the electric power program in exchange for his support of the fertilizer program. . . Dr. Morgan's connection with the agricultural extension services, organizations ramified through every county in the watershed, represented a formidable factor which might conceivably turn the scale of popular opinion from support or indifference into antagonism.¹⁴

It would not be surprising, therefore, if Lilienthal, recognizing that the national political implications of TVA were linked above all to its electric power program, and that this program was facing enormous practical and constitutional difficulties, might have been willing to agree to the delegation of discretion in the agricultural program to Dr. H. A. Morgan. This alignment eventually spelled the doom of such development programs, supported by A. E. Morgan, as were not acceptable to the land-grant college group. These included an emphasis on self-help cooperatives, subsistence homesteads, rural zoning, and broad regional planning.¹⁵

He demonstrates that decentralization and democratic forms may have a conservative rather than liberalizing effect "if the sentiment of the people (or its organized expression) is conservative." After noting the prevalence of white superiority and paternalistic attitudes among the personnel of the TVA Department of Agricultural Relations, Selznick observes:

These responses of the TVA agriculturists are representative of those prevailing within their area of operation. Consequently, in one view, they may be considered to legitimately implement the grass-roots method. Yet it may be suggested that the Authority might have picked a leadership with a more forward-looking approach to pressing rural problems, and cautiously attempt to induce the local institutions to show great concern for the relatively dispossessed elements. It might be suggested that the Authority need not have chosen men who would simply reflect prevailing institutional attitudes; a local leadership need not imply a leadership totally acquiescent in established inequalities and their supporting codes.¹⁶

¹³Burton R. Clark, "Organizational Adaptation and Precarious Values: A Case Study," American Sociological Review, 21 (1956), 327-376.

¹⁴Philip Selznick, TVA and The Grass Roots (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1949, 1966), 92.

¹⁵Ibid., 93.

¹⁶Ibid., 113.

In other words, the TVA's leaders might have selected a different strategy in securing support for their organization. Selznick implies that responsiveness to a more encompassing constituency would have promoted more admirable values. (Schattschneider and McConnell have similarly linked the scope of the decision-making arena with the content of the decision made there).¹⁷ He concludes, however, that neither national nor local decision-making is inherently preferable.

It is essential to recognize that power in a community is distributed among those who can mobilize resources--organizational, psychological, and economic--and these can effectively shape the character and role of government instrumentalities. This has a dual significance. It may result in the perversions of policy determined through representative institutions; and at the same time, this fact offers a tool for ensuring the responsibility of public agencies to their client publics. Consequently, it is naive to suppose that there is anything inherently bad in the situation wherein private organizations paralleling but independent of a governmental administrative structure have a decisive influence on its social policy. Again, however, the situation is inherently ambiguous. This ambiguity must be explicitly recognized, and its mechanics understood, if realistic controls are to be instituted.¹⁸

Selznick is well aware of the fact that the decisions to abandon nationally determined agricultural objectives secured badly needed local support for the TVA. Nevertheless, he underlines the responsibility of leaders to marshall support for precarious values, for without support, they will perish.

Similarly, Thompson and McEwen agree that an organization can choose among a number of strategies in seeking support from its environment; some may require the organization to modify its goals. Goal-setting "becomes a question of what the society (or elements within it) wants done or can be persuaded to support." The authors hypothesize: ". . .the potential power of an outsider (to modify an organization's goals) increases the earlier he enters the decision process." Thus, among the four strategies they identify, coalition could necessitate the most change, followed by cooptation, bargaining, and competition. An organization's leaders play a vital role in ascertaining whether initiative or adaptation is needed to secure support and choosing the strategy appropriate to the situation.¹⁹

Some leaders find new goals for their organizations after the original ones are antiquated, and some formulate goals only after their organizations have survived for a while. The Townsend movement, described by Messinger, continued to survive as an organization long after its goals were rendered obsolete by the passage of social security legislation. It survived by changing its methods of recruitment and financing and by shifting its orientation from achieving its goals to maintaining its existence.²⁰ In contrast,

¹⁷E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966).

¹⁸Selznick, 265.

¹⁹James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process," American Sociological Review, 23 (February 1958), 23-31.

²⁰Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," American Sociological Review, 20 (1955), 3-10.

Maniha and Perrow describe a Youth Council which was created to fulfill a campaign pledge and acquired clear goals only after it had been in existence for some time and despite the initial reluctance of its members. The first members of the Council, unclear about what they were to accomplish, were content to do nothing. However, various groups and agencies in the area perceived the usefulness of the Council to their own objectives, and, after persistent effort, prodded the Council to greater activity.²¹ Numerous studies have been made of organizations whose goals have been outmoded by changes in their environments, but Maniha and Perrow's account of an organization forced by its "aggressive" environment to acquire new goals may be unique.

Identifying the conditions under which citizen participation will increase bureaucratic responsiveness is a task, and, of course, the conditions will vary with the situation, but the arguments reviewed above indicate some of the factors that must be taken into account. An agency's ability to satisfy claims is partially determined by its total resource position, which is, in turn, determined by the place of the agency's goals in the societal value structure, and the competition for resources potentially available for that function. If citizen participants control an agency that is little valued and attracts little support, they may alter the pattern of benefits they receive from that agency but not from the political system (e.g., community action programs). On the other hand, agencies with high social value and ample resources have little incentive to permit authoritative participation by dissatisfied groups (e.g., police departments). However, if these agencies are dependent upon resource suppliers who stipulate that citizens must participate as a condition of funding, then previously weak citizen groups may make them responsive (e.g., some Model Cities programs). But then citizen participation largely depends upon the whim and vigilance of those suppliers who are frequently persuaded to alter their policy by members of their own and the agency's constituency (e.g., Model Cities under a Republican administration). Of course, citizen participation may alienate as well as secure support (e.g., as in some school decentralization battles).

Thus, to explain the relationship between citizen participation and bureaucratic responsiveness, one must know what an agency's initial resource position is and how citizen participation affects its ability to compete for scarce resources. In addition, one must know how citizen participation affects the way in which an agency allocates the resources it already has. In the first instance, the problem is how citizen participation affects relations between the agency and its competitors for scarce resources; in the second, how citizen participation affects resource allocations within the agency. Obviously, citizens' ability to control allocations within an agency varies in part with the amount of authority they have over allocation decisions. Do they merely have a say, or do they have the final say? An agency's responsiveness to citizen participants will increase with the agency's dependence upon them for defining and implementing its primary functions.

Resource-poor groups are unlikely to secure the control they need over resources sufficient to alter the pattern of benefits that they receive from

²¹John Maniha and Charles Perrow, "The Reluctant Organization and the Aggressive Environment," Administrative Science Quarterly, 10 (1965), 238-57.

the political system. Thus, as important as control to their success is the place of their goals in the society's value structure. When people with power share goals with those less powerful, they may act together to alter the way in which the political system distributes benefits. Dispossessed groups are not alone responsible for their condition or for making agencies responsive to themselves, as the strategic and structural sections of this paper indicate. Agencies and leaders of those agencies frequently have a good deal of discretion in choosing which clientele to serve, which values merit protection and promotion, and what constitutes success. Thus, political and professional ideologies oriented toward improving the lot of deprived groups may fundamentally alter how responsive public decision-makers and bureaucracies are to particular groups (perhaps this is the significance of recent trends toward politicizing progressions and universities which preserve and amend these value systems). One popular image of democratic government sees public officials responding to pressure; another sees public officials exercising discretion in defining and implementing public goals. In this country, there has been little public commitment to define and implement redistributive policies. In the absence of public assumption of responsibility, separatist ideologies and strategies flourish, and the goals of heterogeneity, integration, and equality recede.

* * * * *

In this review of the literature on citizen participation, I have shown that the rates and effectiveness with which different groups participate is jointly determined by the psychological and socioeconomic characteristics of the participants, their strategic calculations, and the structural variables determining the constraints within which they make these calculations. I have also called attention to the substantive bases of democratic consent. Many deprived groups have seized upon the small amount of authority delegated to them by the citizen participation clauses of national legislation as aids to the achievement of their redistributive goals. Their analysis of the purposes of participation has differed from that of groups that already have "a stake in the system," and who tend to see citizen participation as a device for increasing the legitimacy these groups confer on the political system and its policies and a device for increasing the quality of information available to policy-makers. Finally, I have called attention to how authority is used, because, with public authority rests the ultimate responsibility for defining public purposes, creating institutions for achieving them, and maintaining the welfare of all citizens, regardless of the rate and effectiveness with which they participate.

Appendix

Relying heavily, but not exclusively, on two summaries of the literature on participation (Lester Milbrath, Political Participation, and Robert Lane, Political Life). I have outlined the factors influencing the rate at which citizens with various characteristics participate in political activities.* The outline is divided into two sections. The first section, "Determinants of Participation: Motivation," examines the likelihood that citizens with varying socioeconomic characteristics and political attitudes will participate in politics. The second section, "Determinants of Participation: Capability," examines the likelihood that citizens who engage in some forms of participation will also engage in other forms.

* Full citations for sources in parentheses can be found in the bibliography.

I. DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION: MOTIVATION

A. Personal characteristics bearing upon the 'cost' for the individual of the investment of energy in participation.

1. Persons who are highly anxious and absorbed in their personal problems are unlikely to be interested in or attach much value to participation in politics. It is easier for a person to allocate energy to politics if the energy demands of the political act are low; as energy demands rise, the frequency of participation declines. (Milbrath, 55 and 70)
2. Those who have faith in people tend also to exhibit politically relevant trust. (Milbrath, 80)
3. It is probably easier for a person who enjoys social activity to enter politics than it is for a person who shuns social and community participation. (Milbrath, 17)
4. Self-confidence and a feeling of social ease are important prerequisites to participation in the socially interactive phase of campaigning. (Milbrath, 25)
 - a. Persons growing up in an upper-middle or upper SES environment are more likely to develop self-confidence and feelings of competence than those from a lower SES environment. This is especially characteristic of persons who achieve the higher ranks of education. (Milbrath, 77)
 - b. Lower-status people, feeling at a disadvantage compared to upper-status people, tend to avoid social contact in mixed groups, withdraw interest, defer to others in "difficult" matters, and generally reveal a lack of self-confidence. Actually, lack of experience and influence combined with pressures to be "opinionated" leads to unrealistic participation in some instances. (Lane, 234)
 - c. Persons with weak egos shun the clash of political argument because of the threat of deflation of their ego. Contrariwise, persons with high self-esteem welcome political discussion and expose themselves readily to political stimuli. Some persons believe they will lose friends or opportunities for business success if they discuss politics. (Milbrath, 46)
 - d. Ethnic groups (based on nationality, religion, recency of immigration, and race) are generally accorded lower than average status in the American society. Low political participation is a function of the acceptance and internalization of this social image of low status and worth by the members of an ethnic group. (Lane, 255)

- 1) Social estimates of low status and worth of a group may turn a group inward so they withdraw from social and political participation whether or not they accept these estimates. (Lane, 255)
- 2) Social contact with the majority in the American (equalitarian) society weakens the acceptance of low status and worth and replaces it with doubts which encourage efforts to repudiate the "low worth" doctrine through political participation. Some of these efforts find outlet in alienated or anti-social politics but most remain in the main political stream. (Lane, 255)

5. Persons who feel more effective in their everyday tasks and challenges are more likely to participate in politics. (Milbrath, 59)

- a. Persons who score highly on the personal effectiveness scale are less likely to resent government. (Milbrath, 73)
- b. Persons who feel efficacious politically are much more likely to become actively involved in politics.
- c. Several studies in several nations have shown that upper socio-economic status persons, especially the better educated, are more likely to develop efficacious feelings. (Milbrath, 57)
- d. Persons of low education may, on the average, place low in citizen efficacy; yet those of this group who have a high sense of citizen efficacy participate in politics in much higher degree than do their fellows of like educational achievement but of low sense of efficacy. (Key, 192)

6. Lower-status persons are less satisfied with their lives and communities, leading, in a minimally class conscious society, to withdraw from civic activities, or, alternatively, to participation in deviant politics. (Lane, 234)

- a. Young, male, high school educated Negroes (both graduates and dropouts) are more likely than other groups to engage in unconventional political participation. (Cataldo, Johnson, and Kellstedt, 12-3)
- b. Willingness to use violence is higher among high-school-educated lower-class Negroes who are racially isolated, feel powerless, and voice a strong disaffection because of discrimination. (Ransford)
- c. College educated students who engage in demonstrations are committed to the society rather than alienated from it. "Socialized to value respectability and achievement, educated to affirm their right of equal opportunity, legitimized in their expectations by civil rights legislation and an important body of opinion, living in a college environment where freedom from constraints and ease of communication facilitate the development and spread of

protest activity, these students have selected non-violent protest activity, as an acceptable means of demonstrating their anger at barriers to first-class citizenship." (Searles and Williams)

7. Child-raising practices in the lower-status groups tend to provide a less adequate personality basis for appropriately self-assertive social participation. (Lane, 234)

B. Orientations toward politics bearing upon the likelihood that a person will be mobilized for participation

1. Cognitive orientations
 - a. Exposure to stimuli about politics
 - 1) Persons who move in different environments are exposed to varying amounts of political stimuli:

More exposure:	Less exposure:
Men	Women
Middle-class	Working-class
Urban-dwellers	Rural-dwellers
More educated	Less educated (Milbrath, 42)
 - 2) The more political stimuli received by a person, the more likely he is to be active in politics and the greater the depth of his participation. (Milbrath, 22, 39)
 - 3) 'Busy' persons, who perceive themselves as having no spare time for politics, protect themselves from political stimuli which are irrelevant to their pressing concerns. (Milbrath, 46)
 - 4) Persons who lack education and sophistication about politics tend to shut out political stimuli. (Milbrath, 45)
 - 5) Lower-status persons have less capacity to deal with abstract issues and less awareness of their larger social environment. (Lane, 234)
 - 6) Even if his mind is made up, the strong partisan exposes himself to more stimuli about politics than the undecided. (Milbrath, 45)
 - a) Primarily, partisans pick up messages from their own side. (Milbrath, 45)
 - b) Group forces on balance provide a net resistance to those messages of the media calculated to alter attitudes and a net reinforcement of messages calculated to maintain the status quo. (Key, 367)

b. Interest in politics

- 1) Persons who are most interested in or concerned about an election are more likely to vote. (Milbrath, 51)
- 2) Older persons are more interested in politics than younger. (Milbrath, 54)
- 3) Several studies have found a significant positive correlation between interest in and knowledge about politics. (Milbrath, 65)

c. Knowledge about politics

- 1) The more sophisticated a person's cognitions and beliefs about politics, the greater the likelihood of his participation in the political process. (Milbrath, 64)
- 2) Persons of high SES, especially high education, are more likely to have greater knowledge of and more sophistication about politics than persons of low SES. (Milbrath, 68)
- 3) Women tend to have a lower level of political concept formulation than men.
- 4) People who become best informed through exposure to the media are most frequently found among the politically influential--that is, those who talk with and advise others.
 - a) By this means the audience of the media may be enlarged; their messages reach indirectly many people who pay no direct attention to the media.
 - b) By the same token, their impact may be reduced, for the influentials are not neutral relayers of the messages of the media but tend to give their own interpretation to the events as they pass the word along. (Key, 359)
- 5) People acquire information about politics from those close to them.
 - a) Persons seeking political information tend to talk with people of their own occupational status, but opinion leaders tend to come from the better-educated members of their respective groups.
 - b) Flow of information and influence tends to be downward through the occupational structure by small steps. (Key, 360-1)

- c) Those who change their voting intentions during the campaign mention friends or members of their family more frequently as sources of influence than do those who remain steadfast in their voting decision during the campaign.
- d) Those who make up their minds late in the campaign report personal influence as a factor in their decision.
- e) People least interested in the campaign relied more on conversation than on the media for their information. (Key, 359)

d. Perception of the importance and relevance of politics

- 1) Persons who conceive of politics as important--that it deals with great events, great men, and crucial questions--are more likely to participate in politics. (Milbrath, 71)
 - a) Persons are more likely to turn out for elections they perceive to be important. (Milbrath, 103)
 - b) A perception by people that the vote will be close piques their interest and strengthens their belief that their vote will count. (Milbrath, 102)
- 2) Perception of the relevance of politics tends to increase with:
 - a) Age: Participation rises gradually with age, reaches its peak and levels in the forties and fifties, and gradually declines above sixty. (Milbrath, 134)
 - b) Integration into the community:
 - (1) The most apathetic group are the young unmarried citizens who are only marginally integrated into their community. Several studies have found that married persons are more likely to participate in politics than single persons. (Milbrath, 134)
 - (2) Participation in community affairs increases with:
 - (a) High stakes or vested-interests in the local community, and hence vulnerability to the consequences of community actions, as represented by such factors as ownership of a home, business, or farm in the community, having a job in the community, being a member of a complete family, and having children in the local school.

- (b) A community-focus of individual life organization and a proliferation of roots in the local community, as reflected in sheer length of residence in the community and involvement in networks of kinship and friendship in the community.
- (c) Extensive knowledge of the local community and various attitudes of identification, commitment, and involvement with local affairs.
(Devereux, 37)
- (3) The longer a person resides in a given community, the greater the likelihood of his participation in politics. (Milbrath, 133)
- (4) A case study of a single community shows that:
 - (a) Migrants differ from the natives in level of participation, but they become more similar to the natives in their behavior the longer they remain in the community. (Zimmer, 1955)
 - (b) Urban migrants tend to enter the activities of the community more rapidly than farm migrants. (Zimmer, 1955)
 - c) Mobility: Upwardly mobile persons, those attempting to improve their class status, may become active in politics as part of their effort to move upward. (Milbrath, 117)
- 3) Persons who perceive themselves or their group as having an impact on public policy are more likely to communicate their policy preferences to officials than are those perceiving little or no interest. (Milbrath, 107-8)
 - a) Political apathy is a function of peasant (or rural Southern) origin with its associated views of government as part of a natural order beyond control. (Lane, 251)
 - b) Lower-status persons have less economic security and, partly for that reason, feel less of a sense of control over their (political) environment. (Lane, 234)

- 4) The relation of public policy to the group stakes at issue in that policy is made more visible to upper-status groups than to lower-status groups. (Lane, 234)
 - a) "There are many examples where voting would greatly further the interests of a group, and still the voting turnout of that group is low. Difficulties of social perception and communication provide a partial explanation for such cases. Two groups may have an equal stake in government policies, but one group may have easier access to information about this stake than the other."
 - b) "... The low turnout of workers and other low-income people may also reflect the relative indirectness and invisibility of crucial economic relationships." (Lipset, 1960, 190-1)
 - c) Ethnicity and proximity to politics:
 - (1) Ethnic participation is increased by the ethnically (group) relevant nature of a wide range of national domestic issues as well as foreign policy. In the United States the more usual class-based issues are frequently subordinated to such ethnically-relevant national issues. (Lane, 243)
 - (2) Party loyalty for ethnic groups is partially based upon an identification of the party with ethnic goals; this loyalty derives its emotional charge from ethnic feeling and, because it is derived, is often unstable. (Lane, 243)
 - (3) Ethnic groups establish special needs for the protection of illegal activities (sometimes conducted with wide ethnic popular support); these activities create strong politicizing motives and the organizations to make them effective. (Lane, 243)
 - (4) The more self-conscious and status-conscious an ethnic group, the more the members of that group will be sensitive to the politics of "recognition," i.e., appointment to office and political candidacy of fellow ethnics. Sensitivity of this kind limits opposition criticism on ethnically irrelevant grounds. (Lane, 243)

- (5) Religious interests and organization (at a later stage) increased political activity of communicants through (a) increasing the social interaction of communicants and increasing their perception of group stakes in political matters, (b) direct political pressures on clergymen, (c) development of church-related political issues, (d) providing an organ of political expression. Those who resist the intrusion of the church in politics are those most vulnerable to church influences. The theological content of the religion is only marginally important for politics. (Lane, 251)
- (6) The greater the ethnic conflict in a community (where all may note) the greater the rates of participation of the conflicting groups. (Lane, 243)
- (7) Geographic, occupational and educational mobility, rather than leading to assimilation into the dominant society, may provide the minorities with the wherewithal for constructing newer and even more elaborate parallel ethnic social systems. (Parenti)
- (8) The assimilation theory of ethnic voting states that: "ethnic voting is stronger during the ethnic group's earliest residence in this country and subsequently declines from this peak as the group's members make their way out of the working class. (Wolfinger, 1965)
- (9) "The mobilization theory of ethnic voting states that: the strength of ethnic voting depends on both the intensity of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic relevance in the election. The most powerful and visible sign of ethnic political relevance is a fellow-ethnic's name at the head of the ticket, evident to everyone who enters the voting booth. Middle-class status is a virtual prerequisite for candidacy for major office; an ethnic group's development of sufficient political skill and influence to secure such a nomination also requires the development of a middle class. Therefore ethnic voting will be greatest when the ethnic group has produced a middle class, i.e., in the second and third generations, not in the first. Furthermore, the shifts in party identification resulting from this first major candidacy will persist beyond the election in which they occurred." (Wolfinger, 1965, 905)

- d) Lower-status individuals can influence and benefit from governmental action only socially, by group activity and membership, while upper-class persons can influence and benefit from such action individually. Therefore, upper-class persons have a higher incentive to participate. (Lane, 234)
- e) The threat of deprivation to upper-strata groups present in the politics of the welfare state provides greater motivation than the promise of reward to the lower-status groups. (Lane, 234)
- f) Lower-status persons experience greater cross-pressure with respect to (a) ethnic versus class identifications, (b) divergent political appeals of the media to which they are exposed, and conflict between media and status identification, (c) community leadership and own-group leadership, and (d) subjective versus objective class identification. (Lane, 234)

I. B. 2. Evaluative orientations

- a. Persons feeling a duty to participate are more likely to do so. (Milbrath, 61)
 - 1) Upper SES persons, especially those with higher education, are more likely to develop a sense of citizen duty. (Milbrath, 63)
 - 2) High status sometimes implants attitudes of social and civic responsibility in persons who enjoy this status, depending upon moral, religious, and cultural reinforcement for such attitudes, i.e., "with privilege goes responsibility." (Lane, 234)
 - 3) The social norms and roles in the lower-status groups tend to emphasize political participation less than do the norms and roles of the upper-status groups. There is a tendency for these political roles to be concentrated in middle-class rather than upper-class or working-class groups. (Lane, 234)
 - 4) White persons and city dwellers, in the United States, are more likely to develop a sense of citizen duty. Persons growing up in the American South are less likely to develop it. (Milbrath, 63)
- b. About one-third of respondents feel that women should not take as active a role in politics as men.

c. Interaction between ethnicity and norms of participation:

- 1) Ethnic groups (with the exception of the Jews) failed to become politicized by broad ideological programs because of the identification of other-worldly religious orientations, fear of further rejection by society, rural backgrounds, and low education, and lack of preparation for their alienation in the New World. (Lane, 251)
- 2) The early religious orientation of immigrant and Negro groups tended to reduce political interests because
 - (a) the separation of church and state reduced the opportunity for political conflict, (b) religion offered an otherworldly solace for temporal ills, (c) church groups became factionated and narrowly in-group oriented, (d) the reinforcement of some religious norms imposed barriers to the broader social participation by communists. (Lane, 251)
- 3) Progress in assimilation means a chance in political motivation for members of ethnic groups. To the extent that citizen norms, economic interests, and pressures for individual (as contrasted to group) achievement can serve as substitutes, ethnic political participation will not suffer a relative decline. (Lane, 255)

I. B. 3. Affective orientations

- a. Persons with a positive attraction to politics are more likely to receive stimuli about politics and to participate more. (Milbrath, 39)
- b. Persons who are psychologically involved in politics are:
 - 1) More likely to feel efficacious about political action. (Milbrath, 56)
 - 2) More likely to engage in political and campaign activities beyond voting. (Milbrath, 51)
- c. Persons with strong preferences for a party, candidate, or issues:
 - 1) Pick up more political stimuli than those with weak preferences. (Milbrath, 45)
 - 2) Are also highly likely to be interested in politics. (Milbrath, 53)
 - 3) Are more likely to participate actively in the political process. (Milbrath, 52)

d. Demographic correlates of psychological involvement in politics:

- 1) Persons of higher SES, especially higher education, are more likely to become highly involved psychologically in politics than persons of lower status. (Milbrath, 53-4)
- 2) Men are more likely to be psychologically involved in politics than women. (Milbrath, 54)
- 3) Psychological involvement in politics increases with age.
- 4) Long identification with a party and long residence in a community tend to encourage strong partisanship. (Milbrath, 53)
- 5) "Mobility, whether residential, social, or job, should also decrease involvement in politics, since the various types of mobility both reduce the extent to which individuals are engaged in different forms of activity, and increase the possibility that they will be exposed to politically relevant cross-pressures." (Lipset, 1960, 208)
- 6) "Social mobility both upward and downward, together with the hopes which many individuals have of improving their position in the future, should increase political cross-pressures and reduce interest in politics." (Lipset, 1960, 208)

e. Persons who score highly on anomie, alienation, and cynicism are less likely to become active in politics. (Milbrath, 78)

- 1) Persons of higher SES, especially higher education, are less likely to develop cynical attitudes toward politics. (Milbrath, 80)
- 2) Political alienation is inversely related to SES. (Thompson and Horton, 1960, 195)

f. "Research on local referendums shows a consistent pattern of negative voting among the socially and economically deprived segments of the population. The research reported here tests the hypothesis that referendums may serve as institutional outlets for protest, that voting against local issues may be an expression of political protest on the part of the powerless and ordinarily apathetic members of the community. The findings from a study of defeated school-bond issues in the two communities show a consistent relationship between powerlessness and negative votes in those cases where a feeling of powerlessness took the form of alienation from certain symbols of power in the community. This relationship holds independently of economic self-interest and related variables. Evidence suggests that voting down local issues does not represent an organized, class-conscious opposition, but a type of mass protest, a convergence of the individual assessments of the powerless who have projected into available symbols the fears and suspicions growing out of their alienated existence." (Horton and Thompson, 1962, 485)

- 1) "...it may be that political alienation is a mediating factor between SES and political participation which provides an alternative to 'subcultural orientation' or self-interest explanations of political behavior in the lower SES categories." (Thompson and Horton, 1960, 191)
- 2) "...opposition to fluoridation is likely to be concentrate in categories of people who have a sense of deprivation relative to some reference group." (Simmel, 1961, 26)
- 3) "The hypothesis that opponents will have greater feelings of helplessness and a lower sense of political efficacy than proponents is fairly well supported by the data given here. It is as if fluoridation somehow symbolized the buffeting one takes in a society where not even the water one drinks is sacrosanct. Furthermore, the leading proponents are generally professionals of high status but relatively little power, making them a particularly inviting target." (Gamson, 1961, 536)
- 4) "Low social status, anomie, and political alienation are shown to be significantly related to a negative vote and unfavorable attitude on the issue of metropolitan government in Nashville, Tennessee, for a sample of suburban residents. Anomie and political alienation interpret, to a very limited extent, the association between social status and political participation in the 'metro' issue. It is concluded that the three independent variables are, for the most part, additive in their efforts on the extent and direction of participation in a local political issue." (McDill and Ridley, 1962, 205)

g. Assimilation tends to depolitize groups when it breaks up the homogeneity of ethnic association life, leads to lack of direction and "anomie," or creates cross pressures which weaken partisan political attachments. (Lane, 255)

II. DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION: CAPABILITY

A. Patterning of involvement

1. "Political activity seems to have a patterning or clustering characteristic. This seems to be true in two senses: (1) variables that correlate with a specific political act tend to correlate with other political acts as well; (2) there seems to be a hierarchy of political involvement, in that persons at a given level of involvement tend to perform many of the same acts, including those performed by persons at lower levels of involvement." (Milbrath, 16)
 - a. Political information-seeking behavior is cumulative. (Milbrath, 45)
 - b. The same persons have high exposure to several different kinds of media, and their high exposure continues throughout the surge and decline of political campaigns. (Milbrath, 45)
 - c. Exposure to stimuli about politics increases the quantity and sharpness of political knowledge, stimulates interest, contributes to the decisiveness of political choices, and firms up attachment to a party or candidate. (Milbrath, 39-40)
 - d. Persons exposing themselves highly to political stimuli also expose themselves highly to nonpolitical stimuli. (Milbrath, 45)
 - e. Persons who are active in community affairs are much more likely than those not active to participate in politics. (Milbrath, 17)
 - f. Persons participating in informal political discussions are more likely than nondiscussants to vote and participate in other ways in the political process. (Milbrath, 40)
 - g. Several studies show that citizens contacted personally are more likely to vote and to be interested in the campaign. (Milbrath, 41)
 - h. Opinion leaders are much more likely than followers to become gladiators (activists). (Milbrath, 23)
 - i. Political conversation flows most naturally and freely when persons of the same sociocultural level interact. (Milbrath, 43)
2. Higher socio-economic status (SES) is positively associated with increased likelihood of participation in many different political acts; higher SES persons are more likely to vote, attend meetings, join a party, campaign, and so forth. (Milbrath, 16-7)
3. Although SES appears to be directly related to the "hierarchy of political involvement," some political activities are differentially related to SES.

- a. "(1) Those of lower socio-economic status are more likely to contact only local officials, while those of higher socio-economic status may contact both local and state or national officials. (2) Those of lower socio-economic status require greater organization and effort for an audience with an official to secure an equivalent effect upon that official than those of higher status. (3) Contacting national officials, at least on foreign policy matters, is a positively accelerated function of wealth and social position." (Lane, 67)
- b. The larger a person's income, the more likely he is to give to a political party or to other public organizations because (a) he is a more visible target to money raisers, (b) his stakes in public policy may be more direct and easily seen, (c) the sacrifices entailed in making the contribution are smaller (on the theory of diminishing marginal utility of money). (Lane, 61)
- c. "In general, members of occupations which guarantee a great deal of in-group interaction in many activities and roles, and which involve leadership skills and knowledge about large problems, are more politically aware, vote more, and have a greater commitment to such occupationally linked organizations as trade-unions." (Lipset, 1960, 193)
- d. "Where high prestige is combined with training in interpersonal relations, easy access to politics, and 'dispensability,' as is the case for lawyers, the result is a dominant position in American politics." (Matthews, 1954, 31-2)

4. Other variables in the patterning of involvement:
 - a. Negroes participate more than whites even when they are of lower status, have lower political information levels, are more cynical about politics and are no more efficacious, because they feel the need for governmental action. (Cataldo, Johnson and Kellstedt)
 - b. Status, information cynicism and efficacy help explain why some Negroes participate more than others, but do not explain why Negroes participate more than whites. (Cataldo, Johnson and Kellstedt)
 - c. High school-educated Negroes participate more than college-educated Negroes because they experience more discrimination (competition between the races for societal resources is perhaps keenest among the high school educated), and have the communicative skills necessary to participate in politics. (Cataldo, Johnson and Kellstedt)
 - d. In general, women participate in all forms of politics with less frequency than men. Although these differences are generally less among higher status and education groups, they nevertheless persist.

- e. Inter-class mobility tends to weaken the forces for political participation, a tendency modified by identification with upper-status (participant) norms by both upwardly mobile and downwardly mobile groups. (Lane, 234)
- f. Political participation, especially voting turnout, is higher in communes which are homogeneous in politics, socioeconomic status, and economic activity. (Milbrath, 119)
 - 1) In societies with residential segregation by SES (SES within political units), the normal tendency for high SES persons to be more likely to participate is reduced. (Milbrath, 119)
 - 2) The more residentially segregated a group, the more municipal administration becomes politicized for that group. (Lane, 243)
 - 3) Ethnics usually participate more in local politics than non-ethnics. (Lane, 243)
- g. Children growing up in a home with a high incidence of political discussion and a high intake level for political stimuli are more likely to maintain a high level of exposure to politics when adults. (Milbrath, 43)

II. B. Membership in voluntary associations

- 1. Membership in voluntary associations is positively related to:
 - a. Socio-economic status. (Wright and Hyman, 1958, 293)
 - b. Economic status of the neighborhood, even when the SES of the member is controlled. (Bell and Force, 1956, 25)
 - c. Informal group participation. (Axelrod, 1956, 13)
- 2. Membership is:

Higher among	Than
Whites	Negroes
Jews	Protestants
Protestants	Catholics
Urban and rural non-farm dwellers	Rural farm residents
Couples with children	Couples without children
Persons between 30 and 60	Persons under 30 and over 60

- 3. When socio-economic status is controlled, the relationship between class and membership is much less pronounced for Negroes.

- a. Lower-class Negroes are more likely to belong to organizations than lower-class whites, while middle-class whites are slightly more likely to belong than middle-class Negroes. Upper-class whites, in turn, are much more likely to be "joiners" than their Negro counterparts.
- b. With these same SES groups, Negroes, without exception, are more likely to participate actively in their associations.
- c. Negroes are more likely to belong to political and church groups than their white counterparts and equally likely to belong to civic groups. (Orum, 1966, 443-4)

3. In general, group members are likely to be more active politically than non-members. Members are more likely to vote, express opinions, discuss politics, contact officials at the national level than non-members, and less likely to feel alienated from society and politics.

- a. Within groups, those most active are also more active generally in politics than the ordinary members. Lane suggests that "group leaders develop 'transferable skills,' useful in political activity."
- b. Even within occupational categories, members are likely to have a higher sense of political efficacy and involvement than non-members.
- c. Organizational membership increases political activity and participation more among those who otherwise care less. In Elmira, "those highly interested in the election vote the same whether they join or not (76 percent to 75 percent Republican); but the less interested who belong to organizations show a difference on the Republican side (64 percent to 54 percent)." (Berelson and McPhee, 52)

4. The increased political activity of group members is attributable to the stimulating quality of social interaction in groups.

- a. "Political participation for an individual increases with (a) the political consciousness and participation of his associates, (b) the frequency and harmony of his inter-personal contacts and group memberships, and (c) the salience and unambiguity of his group references." Membership in associations is more likely to facilitate each of these conditions than is social isolation. (Lane, 189)
- b. "Groups influence the political activity of their members generally by (a) defining the content of morality and duty, (b) structuring their beliefs about their social environment, (c) influencing their opinions about themselves (self-images), (d) affecting their life-goals, and (e) suggesting means for instrumenting these goals." (Lane, 195)

- c. "Groups orient a person in a political direction specifically by (a) redefining what is public and private in their lives, (b) providing new grounds for partisanship, (c) providing new insight into the individual's stake in the status of his group, (d) revealing the relevance of specific policy matters to the individual's personal situation, and (e) stimulating group loyalties which are generalized to include group political goals." (Lane, 195)
- d. Those who participated actively in the ITU's social groups subsequently demonstrated increased knowledge about, and interest and involvement in, the internal politics of the union. (Lipset, UNION DEMOCRACY)
- e. After examining the "differential political activity of participants in a voluntary association," Herbert Maccoby offered this explanation:
 - "(1) Because the objective of the association was community action, the persons attracted to it were fundamentally predisposed to participate in community affairs in general, including political activity in particular.
 - (2) The process of differential attraction was supported by a recruitment procedure which emphasized prior participation in other community organizations.
 - (3) Participants were in contact with highly concentrated groups of political predisposed and politically active persons, both within the particular association, and more especially within other organizations to which they belonged.
 - (4) These contacts with voters tended to activate or reinforce those latent predispositions of participants which were favorable to political involvement.
 - (5) This same process affected the non-participants proportionately less because they were both less predisposed to political involvement and in less contact with politically active persons." (Maccoby, 524)
- f. Putnam found evidence of the operation of "political culture" on the community level: The transmission of political attitudes is a function of the extent and intensity of formal and informal social interaction. "We would expect, for example, the resistance of a closely-knit community to novel ideas to be greater than the resistance of a stolid community, but once a new attitude had 'caught on' in the former, we would expect its diffusion to be faster and more complete than in the latter. Furthermore, we would expect that the individuals most susceptible to novel or deviant ideas would be those most detached from the network of community social relations. This is, of course, a common finding of both anthropologists and political sociologists." (Putnam, 653)

5. The pattern of membership in groups affects the intensity of conflict among competing groups.
 - a. When individuals hold overlapping memberships, the intensity of political conflict is reduced. "The multiple membership hypothesis assumes a chain of relations something like this:
 - 1) organizational membership, 2) exposure to or identification with others of opposing political views, 3) cross pressures, 4) reduction in intensity of political competitiveness."
 - b. "If organizations were homogeneous in membership from the point of view of the major lines of social and political cleavage--e.g., drawing all members from one political party, one religion, one region, one social class--individuals would be placed in situations where their political views would be reinforced and levels of conflict would increase. In that case the chain of connection would be as follows: 1) organizational membership, 2) exposure to or identification with others of like background or political views, 3) reinforcement of views, 4) increase in intensity of political competitiveness." (Verba, 1965, 471)
6. The pattern of membership in groups affects and is affected by an intense community conflict. (Paraphrased and quoted from Coleman, 1957)
 - a. Events capable of mobilizing a community for conflict have the following characteristics:
 - (1) The event must touch upon an important aspect of the community members' lives--education of their children, their means of livelihood, religion, taxes, or something similar.
 - (2) The event must affect the lives of different community members differently.
 - (3) Finally, the event must be one in which the community members feel that action can be taken--not one that leaves the community helpless.
 - b. Several characteristic events carry the controversy toward its climax.
 - (1) The most important changes in issues are: (a) from specific disagreements to more general ones, (b) elaboration into new and different disagreements, and (c) a final shift from disagreement to direct antagonism.

(2) The changes in social organization of the community are as follows: the polarization of social relations as the controversy intensifies, as the participants cut off relations with those who are not on their side, and elaborate relations with those who are; the formation of partisan organizations and the emergence of new, often extremist partisan leaders to wage the war more effectively; and the mobilization of existing community organizations on one side or the other. Finally, as the pace quickens and the issues become personal, word-of-mouth communication replaces the more formal media.

c. Factors affecting the course of the controversy:

- 1) Identification with the community constrains conflict
 - a) By inhibiting the use of personal attacks which can initiate a controversy.
 - b) By not allowing the dispute to degenerate from a disagreement over issues to direct antagonism. . . .
- 2) The organization density of a town has distinct effects --direct and indirect--on the dispute.
 - a) In a highly organized town, the pressure to take sides is very great; every association provides such a pressure. Consequently, any controversy which begins with a mere portion involved is likely to pull in quickly the whole community.
 - b) The indirect effect of these organizations is the creation of a psychological identification with the community. As result, high organizational density in a community tends to draw the community into controversy, but it also acts to regulate the controversy and contain it.
- 3) Higher strata participate more. "The consequences of this differential participation for the lower stratum are two:
 - a) Lower-status people will less often be drawn into community controversy.
 - b) When they are drawn into controversy, they will be less constrained in their activities and quicker to reduce the controversy to personal derogation and attack. . . . These consequences are similarly evident among high-status persons who were previously inactive in community organizations.

4) Interlocking memberships may create cross-pressures. "The consequences of this phenomenon are of extreme importance for community conflict primarily for one reason: some communities, with a high density of associations and organizations, and with great interlocking of these associations create this potential for cross-pressure in their members; others, less tightly knit, do not. Among the first communities, part of the conflict is located within each person, part within each small group of friends, part within larger organizations, and only the remainder at the level of the community itself. In the community which does not create in its members the potential for cross-pressures, individuals are consistent; groups of friends are of one mind; and organizations are unified--all the conflict is shifted to the level of the community itself."

II. B. 5. Participation in organizations tends to increase the competence of an individual but not sufficiently to compensate for a lack of education.

a. Alford and Scoble examined the "relative effect of holding a leadership position versus having some college education upon political attitudes and behavior." They found that: "Both leadership and education are. . .independently related to all attitudes and behavior analyzed. Leadership is more important than education with regard to the 'quantity' of political involvement; education is more important than leadership with regard to the 'quality' or direction of political beliefs."

1) "...the less-educated leaders are consistently 'pulled toward' the better-educated leaders and are consistently 'higher' than better-educated non-leaders in activity."

2) "Education is far more importantly associated than leadership with tolerance of deviant ideas, authoritarianism (here regarded as an aspect of general political orientation rather than as a personality characteristic), McCarthyism, and aggressive internationalism. Neither education nor leadership is significantly related to pro-Negro sentiments." (Alford and Scoble, 259-72)

b. "Participation is associated more strongly with knowledge, and to a lesser extent efficacy, among those of low than high education. This strongly suggests that participation in politics is a significant way for the poorly educated to break out of the circule of political ignorance and low sense of efficacy.

"But the advantages of the better educated are strikingly confirmed also. For they rate high on political competence even when they are relatively uninvolved, and high participation is associated with even higher levels of competence. Low participants with high education excel other low participants in knowledge, sense of efficacy, and ideological sensitivity, and the absolute advantages of the better educated are maintained among the high participants. In other words, the poorly educated do not catch up through participation; they start behind and they stay behind."
(Barnes, 348)

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
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